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Abstract
From April-July 1994, over 800,000 people were killed in a genocide in Rwanda. Since
2004, over 450,000 people have been killed in a genocide in Darfur, Sudan. In both
instances, physical and sexual dehumanization were used against the targeted groups.
While dehumanization in genocide has been studied, most literature on dehumanization
looks at it from a psychological viewpoint, and does not include the socio-economic
factors that can lead to a population being dehumanized and targeted for genocide. In
addition, research on the different types of dehumanization, especially sexual
dehumanization, is needed in order to fully understand the role that dehumanization plays
in encouraging and facilitating genocide. The purpose of this dissertation was to compare
how dehumanization was/is used in the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. Thus, in this
study, I analyzed the literature on Rwanda and Darfur and explain how dehumanization
was spread from the top down by both governments, the role structural violence played in
the genocides, and the types of dehumanization, both physical and sexual, used in each
genocide. This dissertation is a qualitative study that used case study methodology in
order to review the existing literature on Rwanda and Darfur, as well as the literature on
dehumanization. I argued that rape in Rwanda and Sudan was an act of genocide, done to
inflict severe physical and mental harm upon the groups, as well as a measure intended to
prevent births within the targeted group. I concluded with some policy recommendations,
including mental health care for the survivors, steps to recognize and stop the spread of
dehumanization of a targeted group, and the need to rehumanize not only the victims, but
also the perpetrators, in order to build a lasting peace.

vi
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter Introduction
During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus
were murdered in 100 days. Those who took part in the killings included doctors,
teachers, farmers, and members of the clergy. According to Gourevitch (1998), neighbors
killed neighbors in their homes, doctors killed patients, and teachers killed students (p.
115). The killings were highly organized: members of the Interahamwe prepared small
groups in neighborhoods, as well as drawing up lists of Tutsis to be executed and
organizing retreats where members practiced burning houses and hacking up dummies
with machetes, while local leaders referred to Tutsis as devils, and ordered people to kill
them (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 94-95). Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in their
homes, as well as gathering places such as churches, schools, and hospitals.
The genocide was the culmination of events that had taken place since
independence. During the colonial era, the Belgians favored the Tutsi over the Hutu, even
though the Tutsi make up a minority of the population. The Belgians denied education
and job opportunities to the Hutu, and issued identity cards based on the father’s
ethnicity. After independence, periodic massacres of Tutsis occurred until Juvenal
Habyarimana came to power in the 1970s. Although the Tutsis were still denied political
power, they were grateful that the killings had stopped, and did not protest their ill
treatment. However, the uneasy peace that existed in Rwanda was shattered when the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a group of Tutsis who grew up in exile in Uganda,
invaded Rwanda in 1990. The RPF demanded an open political system, and power
sharing between Hutus and Tutsis. A peace agreement known as the Arusha Accords was
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signed in 1993, but it was unpopular with the Hutu extremists in the government. Just as
the Arusha Accords were about to be implemented, President Habyarimana was
assassinated when his plane was shot down as he flew into Kigali on April 6, 1994.
Although it is still not known who shot the plane down, the Hutu extremists immediately
blamed the RPF, and the massacre of Tutsis began that very night. Around 800,000
people were killed between April-July 1994, and the genocide only ended when the RPF
overthrew the extremist government in Kigali.
Since 2004, there has been a genocide in Darfur, the western region of Sudan. An
estimated 450,000 people have been killed, with millions displaced within Sudan and in
neighboring Chad. Those being targeted are the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit, the three
largest “African” ethnic groups in Darfur. The genocide is a result of a civil war started in
2003, when two rebel groups, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) attacked the airport in Al-Fasher, the capital of Darfur. The
rebels demanded equal access to resources, government spending on infrastructure, and
equal treatment by the government.
The government responded by arming “Arab” militias, known as the Janjaweed,
to carry out the genocide. The Janjaweed attack villages, usually at dawn, killing the men
and boys, raping girls and women, burning down the homes, destroying food sources, and
stealing livestock (Flint & de Waal, 2005). Although the government of Sudan denies
arming and supporting the Janjaweed, there is strong evidence to show that the
government is not only arming and supplying the militias, it is also taking part in the
killings (Steidle, 2007). A peace agreement was signed in 2005, but it was broken almost
immediately, and the civil war and genocide are still occurring.
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In both Rwanda and Darfur, dehumanization played a large part in facilitating the
genocides. In Rwanda, the media, including Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
(RTLM), disseminated anti-Tutsi propaganda, such as calling Tutsis “cockroach” and
reminding listeners not to take pity on women and children and to kill every Tutsi in
Rwanda (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 115). The media also routinized the work, comparing it to
everyday, ordinary tasks such as weeding (Gourevitch, 1998). In Darfur, the government
sees the “Arab” groups as racially superior to the “African” groups, whom they call dogs,
monkeys, and slaves. In both cases, physical and sexual dehumanization have occurred.
Physical dehumanization is done via depicting the victims as animals or non-humans,
while sexual dehumanization has manifested in the mass rape of women and girls.
As mentioned above, mass rape has occurred in both genocides. Hundreds of
thousands of women and girls were raped in Rwanda and Darfur, albeit for different
reasons. In Rwanda, rape was an act of humiliation, of putting Tutsi women “in their
place,” as it was rumored that Tutsi women saw themselves as superior to Hutu men.
Thus, the primary goal of rape was to inflict physical and mental harm on members of the
group. In Darfur, while rape did cause physical and mental harm, rape was a measure
intended to prevent births within the group. In Rwanda, women were often gang raped or
repeatedly raped, which caused significant, and sometimes permanent, damage to their
reproductive organs. Pregnancy was not an intended consequence of the rapes, but rather
a byproduct. In Darfur, pregnancy with a so-called “Arab” baby is what the Janjaweed
wants to have happen.
It is important to note that genocide does not occur in a vacuum; individuals do
not decide to try to eliminate an entire group of people overnight. Dehumanizing a whole
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group of people takes time and effort. In Rwanda, RTLM introduced dehumanizing
language, such as calling Tutsis “cockroaches” slowly, so as not to shock or disgust their
listeners. Jokes and comments were used to condition people to hearing derogatory terms
and phrases. The use of the word “cockroach” to mean Tutsi seeped slowly into the
public’s consciousness, and by the time the genocide started, a majority of the population
no longer saw the Tutsis as human and were prepared to eliminate them, or at the very
least, not protest against those who took part in the killings.
In Darfur, dehumanization began after independence and was continued by
successive governments. Racism against the black population of Sudan is systemic, and
non-Arabs are treated with contempt. The government used the so-called “African”
groups in Darfur as soldiers against the people in the south, as most Darfuris are Muslim,
and they were persuaded to kill the non-believers, a.k.a. Christians and Animists, in the
south. When the government no longer saw the African groups as useful, they openly
supported the so-called “Arab” groups in the conflict over shrinking arable land and
grazing sources. When armed groups attacked government planes at the airport in AlFasher, Darfur’s capital, the government responded by arming Arab groups to remove the
African groups from the land permanently. The contempt for the African groups was so
intense that the government did not even consider listening to their complaints and
negotiating with them, but instead, decided to get rid of them once and for all. Darfuris
are often derided as “dogs”, “monkeys”, and “slaves.” This systemic racism and hatred
made it easier for the Arab groups to agree to participate in the genocide.
Along with dehumanization, structural violence was a key component of the
genocides. In both cases, only a small part of the population was, and is, benefitting from
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the resources of the country. In Rwanda, land and money were controlled by the Akazu,
meaning “little house”, a group of Hutu extremists that supported the Habyarimana
regime. Most of the population worked in agriculture, but overpopulation meant smaller
plots of land for subsequent generations, and the fluctuating world markets for crops kept
people in poverty. Most of the aid being sent to Rwanda only helped the small group of
elites. In Sudan, the oil revenues are spent in Khartoum, which is the base of support for
Omar al-Bashir and the National Islamic Front (NIF). Very little of the money reached
the south or Darfur. New hotels are being built in Khartoum, but Darfur lacks proper
roads, schools, and hospitals.
With very little of the money and resources trickling down to the populations of
Rwanda and Darfur, frustration increased among the people, leading to anger about their
situation. The respective governments knew that they would have to redirect that anger
away from them, so they chose to scapegoat the Tutsis and the “African” groups.
Although most of the Tutsis were just as poor as the Hutu, the government convinced the
population that the Tutsi were to blame for their problems, that they were controlling
resources and land that should go to the Hutu instead. Part of this belief was tied to the
fact that the Belgians had promoted the Tutsi over the Hutu by putting them into power
during colonialism, but by the time of the genocide, the Tutsi had lost almost all power
and prestige. However, the successful invasion of Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) forced the government to negotiate a peace agreement whereby they would
have shared power, something the Akazu violently opposed. Thus, by blaming the Tutsi
for Rwanda’s problems, the government was able to convince the population that by
killing the Tutsi, their problems would be solved.
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In Darfur, the African groups own most of the land, as they are farmers, while the
Arabs are mostly nomadic. There had been sharing of resources, as the farmers would
allow the nomads to water and graze their animals on their land. However, when
desertification increased, and the amount of arable land shrank, the farmers began
blocking access to their land. Instead of trying to negotiate a settlement, the government
publicly backed the Arab groups, and argued that the land should belong to them.
Darfuris report being told by the Janjaweed that “…Sudan is for the Arabs. It is not for
black dogs and slaves” (Bashir, 2008, p. 218). The government is providing money and
arms for the Janjaweed, so they can drive the African population out of Darfur and take
over the land. Although desertification is causing problems for both the farmers and the
nomads, the nomads see the farmers as being selfish for cutting off access to the land, a
belief encouraged by the government, who sees the Arabs as superior and thus the
rightful owners of the land.
Statement of the Problem
While dehumanization in genocide has been studied, most literature on
dehumanization looks at it from a psychological viewpoint, and does not include the
socio-economic factors that can lead to a population being dehumanized and targeted for
genocide. In addition, research on the different types of dehumanization, especially
sexual dehumanization, is needed in order to fully understand the role that
dehumanization plays in encouraging and facilitating genocide
The purpose of this dissertation is to compare how dehumanization was/is used in
the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. Although dehumanization has been studied, how it
is spread is still being discussed and debated, and very few studies discuss more than one
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type of dehumanization found in genocide. Thus, in this study, I will analyze the
literature on Rwanda and Darfur and explain how dehumanization was/is spread from the
top down by both governments; the various types of dehumanization, including physical
and sexual); and how both victims and perpetrators need to be re-humanized after the
genocide in order to stop the cycle of violence. The main goal of this study is to look at
dehumanization in genocide in great detail, in order to understand how it is spread and
what types of dehumanization are found during genocide. This dissertation is a
qualitative study using case study methodology in order to review the existing literature
on Rwanda and Darfur, as well as the literature on dehumanization.
Research Questions
The research questions are the following: how was/is dehumanization spread in
these countries? What was/is the impact of physical and sexual dehumanization on each
genocide? When genocide ends, what steps can we take to re-humanize both the victims
and killers? Is it possible to facilitate reconciliation between the two groups in order to
prevent a new or continuing cycle of violence?
Research Method
The research method that will be used for this study is case study. For my
dissertation, I used multiple case design. The reason for this is that I wanted to compare
and contrast two cases of genocide where both physical and sexual dehumanization were
present, to understand how dehumanization is used to facilitate genocide. I chose Rwanda
and Darfur as my cases because while there are many similarities between the two
genocides, the spread of dehumanization varied, and sexual dehumanization carried out
via mass rape had a different intentionality in each case.
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I collected data on both genocides, including books, articles, and websites, to
help explain the dehumanization process in both countries, as well as how physical and
sexual dehumanization manifested in both conflicts. I spent a year gathering, analyzing,
and interpreting my data. I tried to limit my data to reliable sources, such as respected
NGOs, journals, and scholars. I collected data from a variety of areas, including: histories
of each genocide; dehumanization in general; dehumanization in genocide; rape in
general; rape as an act of genocide; and reconciliation and re-humanization efforts after
genocide ends.
Delimitations of Study
The biggest limitation of this study is that it relies on literature to provide the
framework of analysis for the cases. While I tried to ensure that the sources I used come
from respected sources, the problem remains that I could not independently verify the
claims made in the sources. This would have required fieldwork, which was not possible.
Nonetheless, I believe that the literature used clearly demonstrates how dehumanization,
especially physical and sexual dehumanization, played a significant role in both Rwanda
and Darfur.
Another limitation is my own bias. I have been studying genocide for 12 years
now, and I had some ideas in mind for what the literature would tell me about
dehumanization. However, as a researcher, I had to be careful not to let me pre-existing
knowledge influence the direction this study took, or how I interpreted the literature. In
order to do this, I read each source at least 2 times, to verify that my analysis of the
source was correct. I also kept an open mind as I read, and did not automatically
disqualify any literature from an author I disagreed with. For example, some scholars
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argue that what is happening in Darfur is not genocide; while I firmly believe that it is
genocide, I nonetheless included their research because it provided valuable insight into
what has been happening in Darfur.
Definitions of Terms
There are four terms used throughout this dissertation that are important to
explain, and are defined below:
Genocide. I used the formal, international definition decided upon in the United
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948),
which is the following: “The attempt to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group (Article II).
Dehumanization. The Oxford Dictionary defines dehumanization as “The
Process of depriving a person or group of positive human qualities”
(oxforddictionaries.com).
Physical Dehumanization. I define this as the practice of reducing human beings
to non-human entities, such as animals or plants.
Sexual Dehumanization. I define this as the reduction of a group of people,
usually women, to an object for personal gratification or reproductive humiliation.
Commonly Used Acronyms
There are many groups and organizations referenced in this dissertation, so a list
of the commonly used acronyms is important.
UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTLM: Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
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SLA: Sudanese Liberation Army
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement
MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières, also known as Doctors Without Borders
NIF: National Islamic Front
ICTR: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
AU: African Union
IDP: Internally Displaced Person(s)
Outline of Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into six chapters plus appendices. The first chapter
provided a brief background on Rwanda and Darfur and the circumstances that led to the
genocides, the research methodology, the problem statement and the research questions.
Chapter 2 discusses in detail the existing literature on the topic, as well as the gaps in the
current research. It will also provide the theoretical framework for the dissertation by
discussing theories that provide insight into how dehumanization occurs. Chapter 3
explains the research method, including detailed information on how to conduct a case
study, how the data will be collected and analyzed, and the ethical concerns arising from
the study. Chapter 4 presents the findings of the first case study, the Rwandan genocide.
Chapter 5 presents the findings from the second case study, the Darfur genocide. Chapter
6 discusses the findings of the study, the limitations of the study, recommendations for
future research, and policy implications.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
Introduction
Much has been written about the Rwandan and Darfur genocides. Books, articles,
and dissertations explore various aspects of the genocides, including the history of
Rwanda and Darfur, accounting for participation in genocide, the role dehumanization
has played, and the search for justice in post-genocide Rwanda. In this chapter, I will
explore the current works on these various topics, and underline the gaps in the literature.
In addition, I will explain the theoretical lens through which dehumanization in Rwanda
and Darfur is analyzed.
History of the Rwandan Genocide
One of the key books on the history of the genocide is by Philip Gourevitch
(1998). Gourevitch was one of the first journalists to write about the genocide in Rwanda,
and he conducted his research from 1995 to 1998. Gourevitch (1998) interviewed
genocide survivors and perpetrators, government officials, and aid workers to explore the
history of Rwanda and the causes of the genocide. Gourevitch (1998) was critical of the
international response to the genocide, particularly the US response, and points out the
absurdity of the international response after the genocide when he argues that the
genocide had been tolerated by the international community, but dogs who ate corpses
were shot by UN soldiers (pp. 148-149). Gourevitch’s (1998) book covers pre-genocide
Rwandan history, the genocide, and post-genocide events, including the issues of
refugees returning to Rwanda and the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Gourevitch (1998) wrote a clear, concise book that is intended for a general
audience and written in a way that makes the book easy to read. Gourevitch (1998) has
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been criticized for certain aspects of the book, such as appearing to support the RPF and
its government, but it should be kept in mind that he wrote the book right after the
genocide, when the international community in general was uncritical and supportive of
the new government. Overall, Gourevitch (1998) is a good introductory text for anyone
unfamiliar with the genocide.
Another useful source on Rwandan history is Linda Melvern’s (2004) book
Conspiracy to Murder. In the book, Melvern (2004) traces the campaign to exterminate
the Tutsi, and argues that plans began in 1990, right after the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda (p. 20). Melvern (2004) describes the peace
agreement brokered between the government and the RPF, and the UN intervention force
that was sent to monitor the peace agreement. She asserts that the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was a failure due to the limited mandate of
monitoring a peace agreement, non-intervention rules, and lack of interest in expanding
and changing the UN mission by the Security Council (Melvern, 2004, pp. 65-84).
Melvern (2004) explains Rwandan history during the genocide in great detail,
from the government officials who were in charge during the genocide to the failed UN
mission to the use of the Interahamwe and other groups to carry out the genocide.
Melvern is very critical of the international community for its failure to respond
adequately to the genocide, especially the refusal of the U.S. to call what was happening
genocide and for demanding the withdrawal of the UN troops (p. 234). Melvern provides
figures for the genocide, including that 93.7% of those killed were killed because they
were identified as Tutsi; 53.7% of the victims were between the ages of 0 and 24; and
that while most victims were killed with machetes, other methods of killing included
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using screwdrivers, clubs with nails and hammers, forcing victims to commit suicide,
drowning victims in rivers or lakes, burning victims alive, and throwing babies and
infants against walls (p. 253). Melvern’s (2004) meticulously researched and documented
book provides a clear understanding of Rwanda right before and during the genocide, as
well as how the genocide was carried out and the lack of international response to the
genocide.
History of Darfur
Many books have been written about the Sudan, but only a few focus specifically
on Darfur or have chapters on the current events in Darfur. One useful book that helps
explain Darfur in the context of Sudanese history overall is Richard Cockett’s (2010)
Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State. Cockett explored how Darfur was
neglected even before Sudan became independent, and how the government in Khartoum
chose to ignore the needs of Darfur because it was seen as a periphery area, and therefore
unimportant to the successive governments. Cockett talked to government officials who
downplayed the crisis, UN staff in Darfur, refugees, and former Janjaweed militias. One
of the most interesting comments in the book is when Cockett (2010) recounts the UN
Chief in Sudan being told by a government official that the government wanted “…a final
solution in Darfur” (p. 170). Cockett also analyzed the international response to the crisis,
and the events in Darfur up to 2010.
Another good book that provides a historical context for the civil war and
genocide in Darfur is Julie Flint and Alex de Waal’s (2005) Darfur: A Short History of a
Long War. In this book, Flint and de Waal discuss the various parties in Darfur on a
chapter by chapter basis. They start with the people of Darfur-the ethnic groups-then

14
move on to the government, the Janjaweed, and the rebel groups in Darfur, ending with a
detailed account of the war in Darfur. Flint and de Waal’s book is an excellent guide for
people just learning about the genocide in Darfur.
Like Flint and de Waal (2005), Gérard Prunier’s (2008) Darfur: A 21st Century
Genocide analyzes the history of Darfur to help explain why the war and genocide are
occurring in Darfur. Prunier describes the differences between the so-called “Arab” and
“African” groups in Darfur, and the systemic racism and discrimination against the
“African” groups. Prunier examines the lack of democracy in Darfur, the government’s
refusal to alleviate the famine of the 1980s, the use of Darfur as a back-door entry for
Libya to invade Chad, and finally, the genocide in Darfur and the international response.
Prunier’s book is meticulously detailed and lays out the problems of Darfur in a clear,
concise way.
A different perspective on the genocide is found in Brian Steidle’s (2007)
autobiographical book The Devil Came on Horseback: Bearing Witness to the Genocide
in Darfur. Steidle was a U.S. Marine Corps Captain who signed on to serve as part of the
African Union Mission in Darfur. Steidle documented many atrocities in Darfur, which
he describes in great and painful detail. After Steidle’s contract ended, he returned to the
U.S. to educate politicians and the public about what he saw in Darfur. Steidle’s book
will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter.
In addition to the aforementioned books, there are a number of articles written on
identity in Sudan, although I will only mention two here. The first one is by Alex de
Waal (2005), who describes the creation of the Darfur state, the major ethnic groups, and
how identity has been constructed by the government within Darfur. de Waal (2005)
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points out that identity has been simplified in Darfur by the government, in order to pit
the Arabs against the “Africans” (p. 197).
The other article that analyzes identity in Sudan is by Heather Sharkey (2008),
who outlines the Arabization of Sudan in the post-colonial era, which led to
discrimination and wars in the South as well as Darfur. Sharkey (2008) sees the
institutionalized racism and discrimination as a top-down process, one that has ties to the
historical slave trade in Sudan (p. 29). Sharkey does an excellent job of explaining the
historical roots of discrimination that fostered the anger and resentment of the “African”
groups in Darfur, which in turn led to the civil war and genocide. Sharkey’s (2008) article
will be discussed in more detail in chapter five.
Rape in Genocide
It is important to discuss literature on the topic of rape in genocide generally,
before outlining specific materials on rape in Rwanda and Darfur. An edited volume by
Carol Rittner and John K. Roth (2012) analyzes rape in the Holocaust, Rwanda, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Guatemala, as well as rape in international law, rape
as a weapon of war, and rape in film. A beneficial chapter in the book is by James Waller
(2012), who looks at rape as a way of “othering” the targeted group during genocide.
Waller points out that Tutsi women were dehumanized during the genocide; an example
of this is a survivor recounting that Interahamwe members threw a bottle of milk at her
and said Tutsis were like cats because they like milk (p. 83). Waller argues that putting
the Tutsis into a separate, non-human category facilitated the mass rape of women, and
uses the example of Interahamwe referring to rape as “…getting a taste of Tutsi women”
(p. 91). Waller’s chapter will be discussed in more detail in chapter four.
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Unlike Waller, Sherrie Russell-Brown (2003) examines rape in genocide through
a gender lens, as well as a legal one. Russell-Brown recounts specific examples of rape in
Rwanda as acts of genocide, and asserts that the aim of genocidal rape in Rwanda was to
kill Tutsi women via the transmission of AIDS, raping women with sharp objects, or
raping women multiple times (p. 356). Russell-Brown points out that genocidal rape is
not just about women’s identity, but also their identity in a particular group and how rape
can impact this (p. 365). Russell-Brown concludes with a discussion of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) acknowledgment that rape is an act of genocide,
and that Tutsi women were targeted on the basis of both their ethnicity and their gender.
Similar to Russell-Brown (2003), Jennifer Green (2004) investigates genocidal
rape, although she refers to it as collective rape. According to Green, collective rape is
“…a pattern of sexual violence perpetrated on civilians by agents of a state, political
group, and/or politicized ethnic group” (p. 101). Green looks at the acts of violence, the
magnitude of the violence, the perpetrators, the victims, and the victims’ silence. Green
sums up her article by stating that collective rape is usually an indiscriminate crime
perpetrated on a distinct group, for a variety of reasons that include reducing women to
their reproductive capabilities, thus making it okay to attack them (pp. 109-112).
Finally, Allison Ruby Reid-Cunningham (2008) studies genocidal rape through
the lens of its impact on the targeted community. Reid-Cunningham asserts that rape
carries a message to the men of the community that they cannot protect their women,
which causes harm to the community (p. 282). Reid-Cunningham discusses the various
consequences of rape, including bodily injuries, forced impregnation, psychological
problems, PTSD, and the reactions of the community to rape. Reid-Cunningham provides
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a comprehensive explanation of the way genocidal rape impacts not only the survivors,
but also their communities, and how mass rape can destroy a community.
Rape and Sexual Violence in Rwanda and Darfur
In both Rwanda and Darfur, rape and sexual violence against women was/is
rampant during the genocides. All the literature mentioned here will be discussed in
greater detail in chapters four and five. One of the best resources on sexual violence in
Rwanda is a Human Rights Watch (1996) report done only two years after the genocide.
Human Rights Watch meticulously documented, via interviews with survivors, the antiTutsi women propaganda before the genocide, the acts of violence carried out against the
women during the genocide, and the health problems the survivors face, both physically
and mentally. The Human Rights Watch report is difficult to read, as it contains graphic
descriptions of acts of sexual violence against Tutsi women, but it is critical reading for
understanding this violence.
Another good source on sexual violence in Rwanda is an article by Christopher
Mullins (2009), who discusses genocidal rape in general and specifically within Rwanda.
Mullins reviews the different types of genocidal rape, such as sexual enslavement, sexual
mutilation, and mass rapes of women. Mullins rightly points out that genocidal rape is
done to generate fear within the targeted population and humiliate both men and women
within the targeted group (pp. 721-722). Mullins’s article provides a significant context
for understanding the impact of rape during genocide.
Like Human Rights Watch (1996), Nicole Fox (2011) interviewed survivors of
the Rwandan genocide-both men and women-about their experiences with gender-based
violence during the genocide. Fox describes the social status of women before the
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genocide, how rape was used in Rwanda, and the problems survivors have with
discussing their experiences of rape and sexual violence. Fox provides an important
insight into the survivors’ ability to process what happened and their attempts to
reconcile what happened to them with their inability to speak about it to their families
and friends.
Like Rwanda, rape and sexual violence have occurred frequently in Darfur.
Several human rights organizations have written reports on the violence, one of the most
important being the Médicins Sans Frontiéres (MSF; a.k.a Doctors Without Borders)
(2005) report on rape in Darfur. MSF doctors and staff documented the treatment of rape
victims, with over 500 survivors being treated between October 2004 and February 2005
(p. 2). The MSF report outlines the brutal nature of the rapes and sexual violence carried
out against women in Darfur, which led to the government of Sudan responding to the
publication of the report by arresting the head of MSF Holland (Moszynski, 2005). The
MSF report was one of the first to document the extensive use of rape and sexual
violence in Darfur.
Another helpful report on rape in Darfur was written by Amnesty International
(2004). This report contains interviews with rape survivors in Chad and illustrates the
brutal nature of the attacks, pregnancy that resulted from rape, the stigmatization of the
survivors by their communities and families, and the health issues the survivors face. The
Amnesty International report is well organized and detailed, and provides important
information on the impact of rape on the survivors, their families, and the communities.
Like MSF and Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (2005) interviewed
survivors in Chad and Darfur on the mass rape and sexual violence occurring there.
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Human Rights Watch describes the attacks on women, the verbal abuse during the rapes,
and the social and psychological ramifications of being raped and impregnated. Human
Rights Watch ends their report with recommendations for the international community,
which include ensuring confidentiality for reporting rape, taking measures to prevent
sexual violence, and protecting women and girls in the refugee camps.
The last source that I will discuss in this section is an article by Justin Wagner
(2005-2006) on rape as a tool of genocide and the legal procedures for prosecuting
individuals for acts of rape. Wagner points out that the government, both on the local and
national levels, has done little or nothing to investigate acts of sexual violence in Sudan.
Wagner describes acts of sexual violence carried out against women, and argues that
individuals who carried out or authorized acts of sexual violence should be prosecuted for
genocide, as rape in Darfur is legally an act of genocide. Wagner’s article provides useful
information on the legal ramifications for rape and sexual violence during genocide.
Explanations for Participation in the Genocide
Many books and articles have explored the question of why individuals
participate in genocide. Ravi Bhavnani’s (2006) article examines the various explanations
for why individuals participated in the Rwandan genocide. Bhavnani (2006) starts by
critiquing conventional explanations for participation, such as Rwandan culture being one
of unquestioned obedience to authority figures, structural violence, deviant individuals
being predisposed to violence, and the institutional structures facilitating mass
participation (pp. 653-654).
Bhavnani (2006) dismisses the common explanations, and argues that the factor
that motivated participation was punishment, or the threat of punishment (p. 656). Hutu
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who sheltered Tutsi were punished in various ways, including fines, beatings, rapes, and
being killed by their fellow Hutu (Bhavnani, 2006, p. 656). Bhavnani (2006) argues that
the use of punishment created a set of norms whereby Hutus knew that certain behaviors
were expected of them, and those who were reluctant to participate in the killings were
punished so severely that most Hutu chose to cooperate with the orders given to them (p.
666). Bhavnani (2006) also asserts that the norms created in Rwanda were ethnic norms,
which resemble intragroup mechanisms such as in-group policing of members (p. 657).
Bhavnani (2006) created a model to explain ethnic norms, which includes a finite
population of agents from the same ethnic group with a level of animosity toward another
ethnic group and tolerance for fellow group members who do not share the same
animosity (p. 658). Bhavnani (2006) claims that violence-promoting norms (such as the
call to exterminate the Tutsi in Rwanda) can be found in these ethnic groups, but it is not
limited to groups dominated by extremists; in fact, they can emerge in groups dominated
by moderates (p. 663). Bhavnani (2006) contends that strong punishments are a
requirement for the emergence of norms promoting interethnic violence (pp. 663-664). In
sum, Bhavnani (2006) believes that the usual explanations for participation in the
Rwandan genocide are not accurate; instead, a set of ethnic norms that promoted
interethnic violence in groups and used punishment to enforce the norms are what led to
mass participation. Bhavnani’s (2006) article is useful for understanding the punishment
factor in participation, and presents an alternative view for looking at why many
individuals took part in the genocide.
Lee Ann Fujii’s (2004) article examines the transformation of norms in Rwanda
so that actions that were barred, such as murder, could be viewed as not only appropriate,
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but also necessary (pp. 99-100). Fujii (2004) outlines the steps needed to transform the
norms. The first step was to disseminate the genocidal message throughout the country
and monopolize the public space so no other message could get through; the second step
was to give concreteness to the message, which was done via practice massacres; and the
final step was to intensify the immediacy of the message to a level that would persuade
any doubters to become true believers (pp. 100-101). According to Fujii (2004), this
message was that Tutsi were fundamentally different from Hutu, Hutu and Tutsi should
not mix, and all Tutsi were evil (p. 102). This message was spread primarily using radio:
nearly 60% of residents in urban areas owned radios, and around 30% in rural areas did
(Fujii, 2006, p. 104). Using a mixture of music, banter, and editorials, stations like RTLM
reinforced the genocidal message on a constant basis, and many compared RTLM’s style
to having discussions over beer with friends (Fujii, 2006, p. 104).
Fujii (2004) claims that RTLM’s influence over Rwandans grew during the
genocide, as travel and communication became difficult and people relied on their radios
to get news and information; this reliance allowed RTLM to interpret news for the
population and reinforce the genocidal message (p. 105). Before the genocide occurred,
practice massacres were carried out in a few communes, killing a few hundred people to
help prepare individuals for the main event; people were trained when to start killing,
when to stop killing, who to target, and who to spare (Fujii, 2004, p. 107). In addition,
Rwandan authorities disseminated false information regarding the civil war, including
spreading rumors and fabricating Tutsi attacks on Hutu (Fujii, 2004, p. 108). The use of
radio to broadcast propaganda helped create a new set of norms that removed the moral
imperatives against murder and facilitated the participation of individuals in the genocide
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(Fujii, 2004, p. 113). Fujii’s (2006) article provides valuable information about the use of
propaganda in Rwanda and the way in which morals and norms in Rwandan society were
changed to enable participation in the genocide.
One of the most useful works for my dissertation is a book by Jean Hatzfeld
(2003). Hatzfeld interviewed ten prisoners who killed in three communities, Kibungo,
Ntarama, and Kanzenze (p. 9). Hatzfeld (2003) starts off with a discussion of how the
killing was organized; the killers told him that the organizers included members of the
Interahamwe, a municipal judge, and area leaders (pp. 10-11). Hatzfeld’s (2003)
interviews with the killers covered many areas, including overcoming the reluctance to
kill, working in a group during the killings, punishments for not following orders,
looting, and remorse and forgiveness. Hatzfeld (2003) got the killers to share detailed
information about their participation, such as how they viewed the genocide; many of the
killers described the killings as work, with one killer stating “We had work to do” (p. 15).
The killers also described participation in the genocide as less tiring than farming, and as
“…a demanding but more gratifying activity” (Hatzfeld, 2003, pp. 62-63).
With regards to remorse, one killer told Hatzfeld (2003) that he was not sorry for
a single killing he committed (p. 51), while others talked about having nightmares (pp.
157-158). Some of the killers have apologized to the families of their victims, and claim
that when they are released from prison, they will bring gifts of food and drink to the
families, or assist the Tutsis in the fields (Hatzfeld, 2003, pp. 190-192). The killers are
torn on the issue of forgiveness: one stated that the killings were out of their hands, and
therefore, so is forgiveness, while another argues that forgiveness is necessary, otherwise,
the killings might start again (Hatzfeld, 2003, pp. 202-204). Overall, Hatzfeld’s (2003)
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book provides valuable information about the killers in Rwanda, and helps others to
understand that the killers are not a homogenized group.
Nicole Hogg (2010) conducted interviews in Rwanda in 2001 with 71
incarcerated female genocide suspects, in order to gain a better understanding of the
extent to which they participated, the nature of their participation, the legal consequences
for women who participated, and how gender influenced women’s participation (p. 70).
Hogg (2010) starts off her article with a discussion of typical roles for women in
Rwandan society, which include educating the children, managing the household,
advising their husbands, and maintaining tradition (p. 72). In addition, women in Rwanda
are taught to be subordinate to men and not to argue with their husbands (Hogg, 2010, p.
71). Because of these traditions, women accused of participating in the genocide are
rarely accused of being leaders of the genocide; they are normally accused of offenses
such as looting Tutsi property and reporting Tutsi hiding places to the killers (Hogg,
2010, pp. 76-78). A female genocide suspect told Hogg (2010) that she believed women
who participated in the genocide can be divided into three action categories: refusing to
hide Tutsis, assisting the killers by preparing meals, bringing drinks, and encouraging the
men in their work, and exposing the hiding places of Tutsi (p. 79).
Hogg (2010) then examines the way female genocide suspects are viewed by the
law and Rwandan authorities. Hogg (2010) argues that investigators, lawyers, and
prosecutors so strongly believe the gender stereotypes about Rwandan women that they
cannot recognize them as criminals (p. 81). This may help explain why far fewer women
have been prosecuted for genocide than men. Lastly, Hogg (2010) looks at the various
motivations for female participation in the genocide. The first motivation is fear; many
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women told Hogg (2010) that they were forced by the militia to participate in the
genocide, while others claimed they were afraid of what would happen to them if they
refused to participate (pp. 84-85). One woman whose children were Tutsi because their
father was Tutsi poisoned her children to give them a “kinder” death than being killed
with a machete (Hogg, 2010, p. 85). Another motivation was the genocidal propaganda;
women also listened to RTLM, and some women who were teachers and radio
announcers helped spread the propaganda (Hogg, 2010, pp. 86-87).
In addition, the propaganda pitted Tutsi women against Hutu women, and told
Hutu women that Tutsi women would steal their jobs and their husbands (Hogg, 2010, p.
87). The final motivation was that women got caught up in the melee and simply
followed the crowd, or women trusted the wrong neighbor or friend with information
about people they were trying to protect, which led to the deaths of those people (Hogg,
2010, p. 88). In sum, Hogg (2010) does a very good job of looking at a neglected group
in research done on the Rwandan genocide: female participants. Hogg (2010) dissects the
various roles women played as well as the motivating factors, to help others gain a better
understanding of why women took part in the genocide.
Smeulers and Hoex (2010) studied literature on the Rwandan genocide and
conducted 29 interviews with prisoners in Kigali Central Prison in April and May 2009,
arriving at the conclusion that although ethnicity played a role in the genocide, social
interaction among perpetrators and group dynamics provide better explanations of the
genocide (p. 436). Smeulers and Hoex (2010) asked prison authorities for Interahamwe
and other prisoners convicted of serious crimes who had confessed at least partially to
their crimes; the interviews were semi-structured, lasted about an hour, and were assisted
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by an interpreter who translated from Kinyarwanda to English (pp. 436-437). Smeulers
and Hoex (2010) address the concerns about whether the stories the perpetrators told
them were reliable, as the interviewees were discussing events from 15 years prior, and
memory is subjective (p. 438). Smeulers and Hoex (2010) found that the stories told by
their interviewees matched the general picture that emerged from studying the Rwandan
genocide, and the stories showed clear and overlapping patterns not only within their
group of perpetrators, but also with other studies done with interviews of perpetrators (p.
438).
Smeulers and Hoex (2010) examine how the killer groups were formed and why
people participated; they argue that groups were not formed randomly or spontaneously,
but at the initiative of groups like the Interahamwe, who then took charge of the groups
(p. 441). Members of the Interahamwe and other groups recruited participants by offering
them incentives such as food, alcohol, and cash, whereas members of the military took
part in the killings because they believed all Tutsi were dangerous and part of the RPF
(Smeulers & Hoex, 2010, p. 442). Other people were forced to join groups and
participate; for example, older people had to man the roadblocks during the day, while
young people had to guard the roadblocks at night, and the Interahamwe often checked to
make sure people were doing as they were ordered (Smeulers & Hoex, 2010, p. 443).
Smeulers and Hoex (2010) found many motivating factors for participation, such
as greed: individuals who participated could gain their neighbors’ property and material
goods by looting houses (p. 444). Other factors included a desire to settle scores, the
ability to find food, safety, and shelter with others, and individuals being forced to
participate, such as Hutu with Tutsi wives, family members, or friends (pp. 444-445).
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Smeulers and Hoex (2010) assert that in Rwanda, killer groups were organized from the
top-down rather than bottom-up, and the violence was “…instigated, ordered, and
condoned by the authorities rather than…committed in deviance” (p. 446). Smeulers and
Hoex (2010) claim that ordinary checks and balances in Rwandan society disappeared
during the genocide, making it easier for individuals to participate in the genocide, and
many group members felt the need to prove they were the best group members by being
particularly tough and killing lots of Tutsi (p. 449). Smeulers and Hoex (2010) provide
good insight into the group dynamics of the perpetrators in the Rwandan genocide.
Timothy Longman (2001) looked at the links between the church and the state in
Rwanda, as well as the nature of the churches as institutions, in order to provide an
explanation for why many churches took part in the genocide (p. 164). While some
church officials were directly involved in the genocide, most have been criticized for
their failure to halt the violence (Longman, 2001, p. 166). Longman (2001) asserts that
churches helped make the genocide possible by making genocidal violence
understandable and acceptable to the population, as well as teaching obedience to
authority (p. 166). According to Longman (2001), the churches in Rwanda have a long
political history. Christian churches set up during the colonial period helped support Tutsi
domination over the majority Hutu, although this changed following World War II and
during the transition to independence; the churches began supporting Hutu leaders and
Hutu began to fill the leadership posts (pp. 168-170). In the early 1990s, calls for reform
of the churches came from both Hutu and Tutsi, which led to many church leaders being
sympathetic during the genocide, because it could help reinforce their power and preserve
their hold on their offices (Longman, 2001, p. 175). In addition, many church leaders
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supported President Habyarimana, and thus saw the RPF invasion as a threat to their
power in terms of ethnicity, because they gained benefits from the elected leaders,
benefits that would disappear if the elected officials had to share power with Tutsis
(Longman, 2001, p. 179).
Longman (2001) points out that none of the churches specifically denounced the
practice massacres that occurred between 1990 and 1993, and many church leaders
showed their own anti-Tutsi prejudices, which was interpreted by the public as an
endorsement of the regime’s anti-Tutsi message (p. 180). During the genocide, church
officials did not invoke the principle of sanctuary, nor did they speak out against the
desecration of the churches, and many church workers justified the killing as a defensive
measure against the RPF invasion, one that necessitated the unfortunate killing of Tutsi
civilians (Longman, 2001, p. 181). Longman (2001) concludes by stating that while the
churches did not specifically preach ethnic hatred and murder, they did not promote
messages of charity and love for human beings, and supporting the genocide was in the
long run consistent with the theology taught in the churches (p. 182). Longman’s (2001)
article provides good insight into the role of the churches in the genocide, and a detailed
explanation for why so many church leaders did nothing to prevent the massacres of
Tutsis hiding in the churches.
Paul Magnarella (2000) looks at the Rwandan genocide through a human
materialism paradigm, which was designed to bridge the gap between scientific and
humanistic approaches to understanding human behavior and characterizes humans as
rational, emotional, social creatures who are indoctrinated in ideological, ritual and
symbolic systems (p. 23). Magnarella (2000) starts his explanation of the Rwandan

28
genocide by looking at the pre-colonial period; he claims that the Tutsi conquered central
Rwanda and established their rule, thereby making the Hutu subordinate and creating a
caste system with limited social mobility (pp. 25-28). During colonialism, the Belgians
put the Tutsi in positions of power over the Hutu, and instituted agricultural and
infrastructure projects that required a huge amount of labor; this led to a system of forced
labor by the Hutus and brutal punishments such as whippings and beatings for anyone
who did not meet the government’s work quotas (Magnarella, 2000, pp. 30-31).
According to Magnarella (2000), the work demands consumed 50-60% of the
Hutus’ time, which took away from agricultural production and led to food shortages and
famines (p. 31). The distribution of identity cards also happened during colonialism and
rigidly divided Rwandans into ethnic categories (Magnarella, 2000, p. 31). Magnarella
(2000) claims that the causes of genocide include political and economic factors (p. 38).
Rwanda in the 1980s and 1990s faced a major population and land imbalance: there were
too many people on too small plots of land, which drove food production down and
resulted in famines (Magnarella, 2000, p. 38). Tutsi were primarily pastoralists, and
wanted open ranges to graze their cattle, which put them into conflict with Hutus who
needed the land for farming (Magnarella, 2000, p. 39).
Moreover, by the late 1980s, the youth population faced a situation where they
had no land, jobs, or education (Magnarella, 2000, p. 39). According to Magnarella
(2000), there were very few economic alternatives to farming other than working for the
government, and eliminating the Tutsi would open up more jobs for Hutus (p. 39).
Magnarella (2000) argues that the Arusha Accords, which would have forced
Habyarimana’s government to share power with the Tutsis, helped contribute to the
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genocide because Hutus in the government would have lost economic resources; these
leaders then began manipulating the Hutu population into believing the elimination of the
Tutsi was necessary (pp. 39-40). Overall, Magnarella’s (2000) approach to understanding
the genocide focuses mostly on the economic factors, including overpopulation,
unemployment, starvation, and lack of economic opportunities for young people.
Magnarella’s (2000) article provides an alternative explanation for the genocide that
helps expand our understanding of why it happened.
In his article, Charles Mironko (2004) interviewed confessed genocide
perpetrators and concluded that while state actions in Rwanda may have sped up the
process of genocide, the people of Rwanda, acting in mobs, assumed a degree of
initiative in the violence and went beyond the state’s mandates (p. 47). Mironko (2004)
asserts that until insight is gained into how and why the perpetrators participated in the
genocide, it will be difficult to detect and prevent future genocides (p. 48). Mironko
(2004) conducted interviews in six major prisons in Rwanda, and interviewed 100 men,
45 women, and 24 children over three weeks in the year 2000 (pp. 48-50). Mironko
(2004) went to the prisons without making an appointment and had the Prison Directors
randomly call at least 20 genocide suspects who had pleaded guilty; he made it clear to
his participants that he would only tape the interviews with their permission and that he
would not share any information provided with the government (p. 49). Mironko (2004)
found that his participants had believed the Tutsi were spies and accomplices of the RPF,
and many used terms that dehumanized or stereotyped Tutsis, such as cockroaches,
enemy, and forest dwellers (p. 51). During the interviews, Mironko (2004) realized that
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many of his participants used the term igitero, (group attack) to describe how they killed;
many participants said they had taken part in group attacks (p. 51).
Mironko (2004) explains that igitero has two meanings in the context of the
genocide: the first is a group of words associated with hunting, and the second is the
social and political organization that facilitated the attacks on the Tutsi (pp. 52-53).
Regarding the first context, during the interviews, many participants used terms like yell,
to hide, to flush out of hiding, to herd, or to hunt/chase (Mironko, 2004, p. 52). Mironko
(2004) states that psychologically, the individuals called to participate in the genocide
transformed themselves into hunters of dangerous animals, which was part of the
dehumanization process and made it easier for people to take part in the killings (pp. 5253). Regarding the second context, the interview participants discussed the mobilization
of the mobs by the local leaders; the first leader they interacted with was the Nyumba
kumi, a person appointed by the government to control everything taking place within 10
households (Mironko, 2004, p. 54). In addition, people had to respond to shouts or
whistles calling them to join in the killings, to show their support for the government;
some individuals were forced to participate in the killings directly or indirectly (for
example, burying bodies), thus making everyone equally complicit in the genocide
(Mironko, 2004, p. 54). Mironko (2004) concludes his article by calling for a forum for
frank dialogue between survivors and perpetrators to facilitate a truthful settlement,
otherwise there can be no peaceful co-existence between the groups (p. 58). Mironko’s
(2004) article provides useful information about why individuals participated in the
genocide, and helps explain the mob mentality that helped facilitate the killings.
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Scott Straus (2004) spent seven months in Rwanda researching the genocide’s
local-level dynamics, and wanted to come up with a fairly accurate assessment of the
number of individuals who participated in the genocide (pp. 85-86). Straus (2004)
defined a perpetrator as any person who participated in an attack against a civilian in
order to kill or seriously injure that person, and he limited the time period for
participation in the genocide from April 6, 1994 to July 19, 1994 (p. 87). In order to
collect data to come up with a number, Straus interviewed perpetrators using four criteria:
1. Detainees had to be sentenced, as they had less incentive to lie than those awaiting
sentencing; 2. The sample had to be randomly chosen, where possible; 3. Those
interviewed had to have already pled guilty; and 4. The sample had to be national (p. 90).
Straus (2004) interviewed 210 prisoners in 15 central prisons, and found his participants
by asking for a list of prisoners who had pled guilty and been sentenced, and then by
using random, computer-generated numbers to select prisoners from the list; in some
cases, the lists were too small to use random numbers, so he interviewed every person on
the list (p. 90).
After conducting interviews and collecting data, Straus (2004) estimated that
there were between 175,000 and 210,000 active participants in the genocide (p. 93).
Straus (2004) asserts that while this figure supports the claim that there was mass
participation in the Rwandan genocide, it does not support the Rwandan government’s
assertion that it is governing a “criminal population” (p. 94). Straus’s (2004) article is
important because it shows that while there was popular participation in the Rwandan
genocide, it was not to the extent that other scholars claim. It also indicates that
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categorizing all Hutu as killers is inaccurate and damages the prospects for reconciliation
within Rwanda.
One common argument used to explain participation in the genocide is that
individuals were persuaded by the media to take part. The Media and the Rwanda
Genocide is an edited volume of essays on the role of the media in the Rwandan
genocide. The book is divided into four parts: hate media in Rwanda, international media
coverage of the genocide, the media trial, and after the genocide and moving forward
(Thompson, 2007). The essays are written by a variety of scholars, journalists, and
activists, including Alison Des Forges, Roméo Dallaire, Mark Doyle, and Linda Melvern
(Thompson, 2007). There are essays by Rwandan journalists, such as Thomas Kamilindi
(2007), an independent journalist who was targeted for execution during the genocide for
refusing to support RTLM’s message; he and his family hid in the Mille Collines hotel
and survived the genocide (as cited in Thompson, 2007). The edited volume covers both
sides of the media story in Rwanda: the media inside Rwanda, and the international
media’s response-or lack thereof-to the genocide (Thompson, 2007). The book provides
strong, detailed information on the role of the media in Rwanda, and how it was
responsible in perpetrating the genocide.
In his book, James Waller (2002) examines why people participate in genocide
and argues that it is ordinary individuals who commit extraordinary evil (p. 18). Waller
(2002) admits that this is a difficult argument to understand, as humans prefer to see
extraordinary evil as something monstrous or observable from a great distance (p. 18).
However, Waller asserts that people must focus on the ways in which ordinary
individuals become perpetrators of genocide, in order to understand why it occurs (pp.
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18-19). Waller looks at the arguments made for seeing perpetrators such as the Nazis as
psychologically different from ordinary people, by seeing them as “mad” or having
abnormal brains (pp. 58-59). However, while some Nazis did have psychological issues,
most were normal, rational individuals (p. 66).
In addition to looking at psychological arguments, Waller (2002) explores
biological arguments for understanding human nature, such as whether or not people are
born inherently good, and if humans are prone to committing evil acts (p. 136). Waller
argues that there are some biological traits, but people participate in genocide for a
variety of reasons, including: intergroup competition, being oriented toward obeying
authorities, moral justifications for violence, dehumanization, conformity to peer
pressure, and blaming the victims. Waller’s (2002) book provides an in-depth exploration
of why individuals participate in evil acts such as genocide, and is very useful for my
research. Waller will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.
Like Waller, Steven Baum (2008) explores the psychological reasons for why
genocide occurs, as well as the psychology of perpetrators and bystanders. Baum (2008)
lists eight stages of genocide: 1. classification of people into “us and them”; 2.
Symbolization, for example, forcing Jews to wear yellow stars; 3. Dehumanization of the
target group; 4. Organization of genocide by the state or groups; 5. Polarization to drive
groups apart; 6. Identification of victims; 7. Extermination of victims; and 8. Denial of
genocide by the perpetrators (pp. 33-35). When looking at perpetrators, Baum (2008) lists
traits shown in perpetrators, including conformity to social conventions, submission to
authority, and an aggressive law and order culture (pp. 124-130).
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Baum argues that leaders of genocide do not subscribe to the same mindset as the
followers, and they are often brighter and more manipulative than their followers, as well
as being more charismatic (pp. 135-136). In terms of bystanders, Baum claims that they
are concerned with safety and having a place in the world, are more insecure and are less
emotionally developed (pp. 154-155). In addition, bystanders will attempt to justify their
passivity and reduce their guilt over not intervening by distancing themselves from the
victims and by devaluing the victims; this behavior may lead some bystanders to join the
perpetrators (Baum, 2008, p. 156). This was seen in Rwanda, when individuals who did
not participate were coerced or persuaded to take part in the killings. Baum’s (2008)
work provides good information on the psychological traits of perpetrators and how these
traits lead to individuals taking part in genocide.
Philip Zimbardo (2007) is the social psychologist who carried out the famous
Stanford Prison Experiment, which showed how certain situations can lead to the abuse
of power and the abuse of individuals. Zimbardo (2007) describes the Stanford Prison
Experiment in detail, providing a clear picture of how the experiment devolved to the
point where the participants were no longer playing a part, but had become fully
immersed in their roles. Zimbardo (2011) admits that he became so caught up in the
experiment that it took his girlfriend pointing out to him that the treatment of the
participants was wrong to get him to end the experiment early (p. 170). Zimbardo (2007)
discusses how he morphed into his role as the Prison Authority Figure, and became an
authority figure he disliked, one who is authoritarian (p. 180). Zimbardo (2007) uses his
description and analysis of the Stanford Prison Experiment to explain how people can
become caught up in evil acts, for example, the prison guards at Abu Ghraib who carried
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out acts of torture and humiliation such as kicking, beating, dragging prisoners around on
leashes, and keeping the prisoners naked (p. 416). Zimbardo (2007) concludes the book
by providing accounts of individuals who have resisted social, situational, and
psychological influences to participate in terrible acts, and claims that heroic individuals
should be celebrated, because they help counter evil influences and remind us of our
humanity (p. 488). Zimbardo’s (2007) book is beneficial for anyone who wants to
understand how certain situations can lead individuals to carry out acts they might never
do otherwise.
Explanations for why genocide occurs
Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley (2006) attempt to explain why genocide
occurs, incorporating history, politics, and psychology into their work. Chirot and
McCauley (2006) assert that mass killing is not irrational, but is the result human beings
thinking of competing groups in stereotypical ways, which can lead to demonization and
dehumanization; in addition, our emotions, such as anger, fear, and resentment,
predispose us to violence when we feel threatened, which can then lead to mass murder
(p. 7).
Chirot and McCauley (2006) claim there are four main motives for mass murder:
1. Convenience: when two parties are in conflict, the stronger party may believe that
mass murder and expulsion is the cheapest solution for ending the conflict, such as the
forced removal of Native Americans from their lands; 2. Revenge: impressing upon the
enemy that attacking “us” will lead to an avenging of hurt pride, for example the mass
murder of the Herero by the Germans in the early 1900s; 3. Simple Fear: failure to
enforce vengeance will allow the enemy to regain their strength and retaliate, for example
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Stalin’s killing and forced starvations of various groups such as Kulaks, Chechens, and
Jews; 4. Fear of Pollution: mass murders that are ethnically, religiously, or ideologically
based; for example, the massacre of communists in Indonesia (pp. 20-38). Chirot and
McCauley (2006) then discuss the psychological foundations of mass murder, including
organization of participants, emotional appeals from leaders, fear of the other group and
fear of extinction, anger, and hate (pp. 57-71).
Chirot and McCauley (2006) end their work with a discussion of strategies to
decrease mass murder; these include international interventions to end violence, using
international pressure to bring the perpetrators to justice, limiting the demands for justice
and revenge: using truth and reconciliation commissions that allow for perpetrators to
confess to guilt, but also limit punishments, building friendships between communities,
and building civil society from the ground up (pp. 170-190). Chirot and McCauley’s
(2006) book is helpful for understanding the various motivating factors for mass murder
and genocide, and it provides practical solutions for attempting to end episodes of mass
murder.
Barbara Coloroso (2007) looks at why genocide occurs through a different lens,
that of bullying. Coloroso (2007) argues that genocide is a form of extreme bullying, in
which a bully rises to power, espouses a murderous ideology, creates a group wherein
brutality becomes the norm, and leads to ordinary people performing murderous tasks
that become normalized and routinized (pp. 52-53). Coloroso argues that children learn
racial slurs and the rules of bigoted behavior through stereotyping, prejudice, and
discrimination (p. 67). Coloroso provides an example of this when she discusses a math
problem in a Rwandan worksheet from the 1960s: “If you have ten cockroaches in your
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town and you kill four of them, how many do you have left to kill?” (p. 58).
Reinforcement of racist ideologies and the use of dehumanizing language makes
participation easier.
Coloroso (2007) also explores obedience and routinization in genocide. Coloroso
states that there are two types of obedience: obedience because of the rule, and obedience
because of the role (p. 107). The poor participants in the genocide took part because they
had learned to obey any rule handed down by the authority, and those of the higher
economic status obeyed because of the role they played in the government (p. 107).
Coloroso argues that once people agree to totally obey orders, those who participate in
genocidal actions will aggressively try to get others to take part, so no one will have clean
hands, and the attitude will be one of “we are all in this mess together” (p. 108). In
addition, those in charge will routinize and normalize cruelty, because this will make it
easier for communities to participate in the genocide (p. 108). According to Coloroso,
routinization involves the sanitizing of language. For example, killing becomes the final
solution, cutting the tall trees, clearing the brush, etc., and those participating in the
Rwandan genocide used terms like “collecting cabbage” when delivering the severed
heads of Tutsis to their commander in order to cover up the reality of having killed
another human being (pp. 108-109). Coloroso’s book provides a different angle of
looking at why genocide occurs, and her discussion of the routinization of genocide is
important for understanding why people participate in genocide.
David Livingstone Smith (2011) explores why human beings dehumanize one
another, and how dehumanization has been used throughout history. Smith (2011) starts
with an analysis of dehumanization in wars, especially World War 2. Smith (2011)
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reminds us that it was not just the Nazis who dehumanized the enemy; Russian
propagandists described the Germans as having animal breath, and called on Russian
soldiers to kill every German they could (pp. 16-17). During the capture of Nanjing by
the Japanese, soldiers raped, mutilated, and tortured thousands of Chinese civilians, while
viewing them as bugs or pigs, and American publications portrayed the Japanese as
cockroaches and rats (Smith, 2011, pp. 17-19). Smith (2011) then discusses how
dehumanization was viewed historically; medieval Muslims believed that humans could
be transformed into subhuman creatures such as pigs, apes, and rats as punishment by
God (p. 43). A seventh-century poet described women as subhuman creatures created
from sows, vixens, donkeys, and monkeys (Smith, 2011, p. 30).
Smith (2011) also explores the psychological aspects of dehumanization through
an outgroup bias: people have a tendency to favor members of their own group while
discriminating against outsiders, seeing our group as more industrious, intelligent, and so
forth; people also tend to care more for certain people than others (pp. 49-51). Smith
(2011) then looks at the use of dehumanization in wars, genocide, and racial beliefs, and
concludes by calling for more time, money, and talent to be devoted to figuring out how
exactly dehumanization works, so it can be dealt with effectively, and perhaps prevented
(pp. 272-273). Smith’s (2011) book is very helpful for understanding the historical roots
of dehumanization, and why human beings dehumanize each other. Smith will be
discussed in more detail later on in the chapter.
Ervin Staub (2000) provides a brief description of the influences leading to
genocide and mass killing, such as difficult life conditions and group conflict (pp. 368369). Difficult life conditions include economic problems, political conflict, and intense
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and rapid social change that frustrate basic human needs (Staub, 2000, pp. 369-370).
Staub (2000) claims that in order to satisfy their needs for identity and connection, people
turn to a group and then elevate their group by psychologically or physically diminishing
the other group; they scapegoat another group for their problems, and engage in harmful
actions against the other group (p. 370). Another factor contributing to genocide is past
victimization of a group and the unhealed wounds; without healing, the group will feel
diminished and vulnerable (Staub, 2000, p. 370). Staub (2000) believes a good example
of past victimization can be found in the Bosnian genocide, when Serbs felt like they
were being attacked by Croatia (p. 371).
Staub (2000) argues that in order to heal past victimization, members of
victimized groups need to re-experience their pain, sorrow, and loss under safe
conditions, as well as receive empathy, support, and affirmation from people outside the
group (p. 376). Staub (2000) led a project in Rwanda that promoted reconciliation in the
community; the project had several positive impacts, including reaffirming the humanity
of the participants, shifting attitudes about the perpetrators so they are no longer seen as
simply being evil, and helping individuals understand the factors that led to the genocide
so they can try and prevent the recurrence of violence (p. 378). Staub’s (2000) article
provides a good outline of some of the major factors that contribute to genocide, and how
understanding these factors might help facilitate genocide prevention in the future.
Another good source that examines why genocide happens is Daniel Goldhagen’s
(2009) book Worse than War. Goldhagen argues that instead of studying the most
familiar genocides together and then drawing conclusions, we should study each case of
genocide individually because all instances of genocide vary from each other, and these
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differences must be understood in order to know the phenomenon of genocide and each
case of genocide (p. 30). Goldhagen makes a very good argument for how war and
genocide intertwine, as was the case in Rwanda and Darfur:
…War makes people more likely to consider eliminationist initiatives. It
encourages people to see violent and lethal measures as appropriate for dealing
with real or imagined problems that had or would have been previously managed
differently…. War also creates new practical opportunities to act on eliminationist
desires, by giving perpetrators better access to the potential victims, and by
lessening the perceived cost of committing mass murder (p. 40).
Goldhagen (2009) claims that in order for genocide to happen, at some point, one
or a few people will consciously decide to slaughter thousands or millions of fellow
human beings (p. 69). In addition, the worldviews, aspirations, prejudices and hatreds,
and personalities of this group of people are crucial, because without their influence,
genocide will not happen (p. 73). This can be seen in Rwanda, where the political leaders,
in addition to media outlets like the RTLM radio station, influenced the general
population’s worldviews and beliefs about the Tutsis, and helped the population conclude
that the Tutsis were a threat that must be eliminated. Goldhagen argues that the
perpetrators’ initiative to take action is not the result of blindly following orders or
simply doing a job, but as the action of individuals who are influenced by their values
and beliefs and choose to act (p. 170). Goldhagen will be discussed in more detail later in
the chapter.
Peter Uvin (1998) explains why genocide occurs through a different lens, by
using Galtung’s (1969) structural violence theory to analyze the Rwandan genocide. Uvin
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provides a detailed explanation of Rwandan political history from independence to the
genocide, and how the elites created a system whereby the state controlled all factors of
life, including jobs, education, and prescription of social behaviors (p. 22). Uvin (1998)
raises a good point when he remarks that after independence, “…One monoethnic power
system had been replaced with another…” (p. 20). Uvin discusses the role of the
international community in supporting structural violence in Rwanda: many donors chose
to ignore human rights violations and the suppression of the Tutsis in order to justify their
aid work, and wrote reports that praised Rwanda for its economic growth and cultural and
social cohesion (p. 44).
Uvin (1998) describes how Rwanda went from suffering from structural violence
to experiencing acute violence. Uvin rightly points out that structural violence provokes
anger and frustration, which significantly increases the potential for acute violence (p.
107). Uvin describes how lack of economic opportunities, corruption, immobility of the
population and complete control by state actors created the perfect storm for physical
violence to occur in the form of genocide. Uvin will be discussed in greater detail later in
this chapter.
Justice in post-genocide Rwanda
Elizabeth Neuffer (2001) interviewed victims and perpetrators of the Bosnian and
Rwandan genocides, as well as the judges presiding over some of the trials, to explore
how people in Bosnia and Rwanda came to terms with what happened in their country
and attempted to move forward. Neuffer (2001) moves back and forth between Bosnia
and Rwanda, and tells the stories of individuals who struggled to survive the genocides.
Neuffer (2001) describes the problems the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
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(ICTR) faced, including lack of funding, inability of witnesses to get permission to travel
from Rwanda to Arusha, Tanzania (where the court is based), and the fact that the
strongest punishment the ICTR could hand out was life imprisonment, whereas in
Rwanda, people convicted of genocide could face the death penalty (pp. 256-257). The
lack of death penalty for the ICTR trials was strongly criticized by Rwandans, who
argued that the ICTR was sentencing the architects and organizers of the genocide to life
in prison, while those who had followed orders were being executed (Neuffer, 2001, pp.
256-257).
One of the strongest chapters of Neuffer’s (2001) book is “What a Tutsi Woman
Tastes Like”, the chapter in which she examines the role of rape in the Rwandan
genocide and the conviction of mayor Jean-Paul Akayesu, the first man found guilty of
genocide by an international tribunal, and the first case in which rape was held by a court
to be an act of genocide and a crime against humanity (pp. 271-272). Neuffer (2001)
discusses the role of rape in war throughout history, and how war and rape go hand in
hand (pp. 272-274). Neuffer (2001) describes the testimony of a witness given the
pseudonym JJ, whose testimony was critical for the conviction of Akayesu. According to
JJ, Akayesu told Tutsi women to come to the cultural center, where he then turned them
over to be raped by the militia (Neuffer, 2001, p. 288). During the second day of rapes,
Akayesu told the killers, “Never ask me again what a Tutsi woman tastes like…tomorrow
they will all be killed” (Neuffer, 2001, p. 289). Neuffer’s (2001) discussion of the role of
rape in the genocide is important, because rape has often been downplayed or even
ignored in discussions of the genocide, but it can be an act of genocide. Neuffer (2001)
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provides a strong account of the search for justice after genocide and how it has often
failed, as well as how people affected by genocide try to rebuild their lives.
Rimé, Kanyangara, Yzerbyt, and Paez (2011) designed a quantitative study to
examine the effectiveness of the Gacaca tribunals on the reintegration and coexistence in
communities of perpetrators and victims (p. 698). Rimé et. al. (2011) had 8 hypotheses
they tested: 1. Participation in Gacaca was expected to increase negative emotions in
victims as well as perpetrators; 2. The exchange of power in the Gacaca process would
increase antagonistic emotions (i.e. anger) among victims and reduce them among
perpetrators as well as reducing shame for victims and increasing it for perpetrators; 3.
Victims’ and perpetrators’ ingroup identification would be lower after participation in
Gacaca; 4. Stereotypes about the outgroup would become more positive after Gacaca for
both victims and perpetrators; 5. A more heterogeneous perception of the other group
would be manifested for both victims and perpetrators after participation in Gacaca; 6.
Indicators of positive emotional climate and social cohesion would be evaluated more
positively by both groups; 7. The social integration effects of hypotheses 3-6 would be
mediated by emotional changes elicited by participation in Gacaca; and 8. An assessment
of the degree to which participants exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder
before and after their participation in Gacaca (pp. 698-699). To test these hypotheses,
Rimé et. al. (2011) conducted a study using 755 volunteers who could read and write in
Kinyarwanda and were at least 18 years old; 395 were victims and 360 were participants
(p. 699). Participants rated their responses on scales, some of which went from “not at
all” to “a great deal”, “not at all characteristic” to “very characteristic”, and “very
different” to “very similar” (Rimé et. al., 2011, pp. 699-700).
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Rimé et. al. (2011) also used a control group in communities where Gacaca had
not yet taken place (p. 699). For hypothesis 1, the results supported the prediction:
negative emotions increased for victim and perpetrator participants, including fear,
anxiety, and sadness; for hypothesis 2, victims reported much less shame after Gacaca
than the control group, whereas perpetrators reported more shame after Gacaca than
before (Rimé et. al., 2011, p. 701). For hypothesis 3, ingroup identification decreased for
both victims and perpetrators after a Gacaca trial; for hypothesis 4, positive stereotypes of
the other group increased for both victims and perpetrators after Gacaca, whereas there
was a decrease in the control group; for hypothesis 5, there was a significant decrease in
the perceived homogeneity of the outgroup after participation in Gacaca for both groups,
while there was no change among the victims in the control group and a slight increase
among the perpetrators (Rimé et. al., p. 701). For hypothesis 6, the hypothesis was
supported for perpetrators, but not for victims; for hypothesis 7, participation in Gacaca
both increased negative resignation emotions and improved social integration; and for
hypothesis 8, PTSD decreased for the perpetrators after participating in Gacaca, but
greatly increased for the victims (Rimé et. al., 2011, pp. 702-703). Overall, the Gacaca
system has its strengths and weaknesses, but it seems to have a positive effect on
reconciliation in Rwanda.
Dina Temple-Raston (2005) looked at the power and influence of the Rwandan
press on the population, and how the press manipulated facts and events to convince
people to take part in the genocide. The trial of Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze was the first trial of journalists for genocide since the
Nuremberg trials (Temple-Raston, 2005, p. 102). Temple-Raston (2005) starts with a
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discussion of Rwandan history, and how the three men became involved in Rwandan
media; she then talks about the propaganda the journalists put out, and concludes by
describing their trial. Temple-Raston (2005) talked to ordinary Rwandans, court
prosecutors, and defense lawyers, to paint a picture of the trial and how it proceeded.
Nahimana and Barayagwiza for journalists for the RTLM radio station, while Ngeze ran
the newspaper Kangura (Temple-Raston, 2005, pp. 32-33).
Temple-Raston (2005) does a good job of explaining how the three journalists
used their respective media outlets to promote anti-Tutsi propaganda. Kangura started off
with cartoons spoofing Tutsis, but quickly went on to accuse the RPF of initiating a war,
and Ngeze asserted that the war would begin with the assassination of President
Habyarimana (Temple-Raston, 2005, pp. 40-41). Kangura later went on to publish a
headline captioned “What weapons shall we use to conquer the Inyenzi once and for all?”
with a drawing of a machete underneath it (Temple-Raston, 2005, p. 29). RTLM was
popular from the beginning, when it started off by playing Congolese music, and featured
call-in shows and shock jocks; it also gave people the opportunity to express themselves:
they could call in with complaints and local news and gossip (Temple-Raston, 2005, p.
2). RTLM later introduced anti-Tutsi language, and warned citizens to be vigilant; it was
also the first to report on the death of President Habyarimana, and accuse Tutsis of being
behind the attack (Temple-Raston, 2005, p. 4). Temple-Raston (2005) provides detailed
information about the trial, including the flaws, problems with getting documents, and
slowness of the trial. All three journalists were convicted, but the trial, and TempleRaston’s (2005) book, raised important questions about the limits of free speech and the
ethics of journalism.
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Gaps in the Literature
While the literature mentioned in this chapter is extremely useful, there are still
some gaps in the literature. One of the biggest gaps is the lack of discussion on sexual
dehumanization in genocide. Most books written on genocide will describe physical
dehumanization in great detail, but will only briefly mention sexual dehumanization, or
will talk about rape as something separate from genocide. However, we know that
genocidal rape is in a category of its own. Genocidal rape is different from rape that
occurs in war or in society, because the intentionality is different. I will discuss these
ideas in greater detail in chapters four and five. The other major gap is the lack of
discussion of dehumanization in general in books on genocide. Most books will mention
dehumanization in passing, but do not usually go into great detail about the role that
dehumanization plays in genocide. If a society is not properly prepared to take part in, or
at the very least ignore the killings of, the targeted group via constant reinforcement of
dehumanization, then genocide is not likely to happen. It is my contention that if we do
not understand the impact dehumanization has on various aspects of genocide, such as
participation, we cannot stop genocide from happening.
Theoretical Framework
Structural Violence
Structural violence is a theory introduced by Johan Galtung in the late 1960s, and
it describes a type of systemic violence that is not necessarily physical, but is usually
indirect and includes things like starvation and higher life expectancy in upper classes
versus lower classes (Galtung, 1969, p. 171). Rwanda had a highly organized structure,
with a few individuals at the top controlling power, access and resources, and a majority
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of the people living in poverty. According to Uvin (1998), about 15 percent of the
farmers in Rwanda owned half of the land (p. 113), and in Butare, the richest 10 percent
earned 66.4 percent of the region’s income in 1992 (p. 115). President Habyarimana’s
wife Agathe ran a small influential group called the akazu, or little house. The akazu
controlled the political, economic, and military muscle and the patronage that was
eventually called “Hutu Power” (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 80-81). If anyone crossed Agathe
or the akazu, they were assassinated or jailed (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 81).
In addition, Galtung (1969) claims that in structural violence, the power over the
distribution of resources is unevenly spread, and the uneven distribution is exacerbated if
individuals who are poor are also under educated, in poor health, and lacking power (p.
171). One of the factors that furthered systemic poverty was the lack of mobility for
people. Residence permits were required to stay anywhere, and travel permits were
needed to move, which meant that individuals who could not make a living in rural areas
were not easily allowed to move to urban areas in search of opportunities (Uvin, 1998, p.
116). According to Uvin (1998), the justification for the permits was that the government
wanted to fight urban poverty and prevent slum creation, which worked, although it kept
most of the population trapped in rural areas (p. 116). Additionally, education, health
care, and economic opportunities were highest in urban areas, which meant that the youth
in the countryside were semi-educated and unable to build a future for themselves beyond
trying to farm a tiny plot of land (p. 116). Uvin (1998) points out that 90 percent of the
rural population lived below the poverty line, and the lack of mobility kept people
trapped in poverty (p. 117).
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This lack of mobility supports Galtung’s (1969) assertion that structural violence
includes violence that is objectively avoidable- for example, if people are starvingregardless of whether or not there is a clear relation between the person committing the
act and the person being influenced by it (p. 171). By refusing to allow people to have the
basic rights of being able to move from rural areas to urban ones or to get a job without
having to be part of the patronage system, the akazu created a climate whereby
individuals were stuck in poverty, with no hope of escape. Uvin (1998) rightly argues that
structural violence provokes anger, frustration, ignorance, and despair, all of which
increases the likelihood of acute violence (p. 107). Young men were hit especially hard
by the structural violence in Rwanda: they had much less land than their fathers, which
meant that they could not support their families or get married; hundreds of thousands of
young men were forced to search for temporary jobs in lieu of permanent ones, and could
not make a living in agriculture (Uvin, 1998, p. 118).
The lack of opportunities for the youth population meant that individuals were
more easily manipulated by those in charge, and the loss of self-respect lead to frustration
and anger, as well as a desire to regain self-respect (Uvin, 1998, p. 136). Furthermore, the
decline in the economy exacerbated the frustrations of the population. The Rwandan
economy relied heavily on coffee exports, which declined from $144 million in 1985 to
$30 million in 1993, and the GDP per capita fell from $355 in 1983 to $260 in 1990
(Uvin, 1998, p. 54). Additionally, the civil war that started in 1990 displaced populations
in the major food-producing regions, which led to a decline in government revenue, and
also led the government to spend more money on arms and military expenditures and less
on social programs (Uvin, 1998, p. 56). In response, the elites in Rwanda manipulated
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this frustration and anger and redirected it from themselves onto the Tutsis. According to
Uvin (1998), “…The official, state-sponsored racism against Tutsi…provided a
convenient, institutionalized scapegoat (and diverted attention away from the privileges
enjoyed by a few in the name of the masses)” (p. 137).
As mentioned previously, Uvin (1998) argues that the international community
supported structural violence in Rwanda. One of the ways it did so was by ignoring
human rights abuses. For example, the government issued cards identifying individuals as
Hutu or Tutsi, and a quota system was introduced wherein access to higher education and
state jobs for Tutsi were limited to a number theoretically equal to the proportion of
Tutsis in the population (Uvin, 1998, p. 35). According to Uvin, the international
community knew about the quota system, and not one aid agency denounced the identity
cards or quota system, even when they knew they were being used to prepare for mass
killings (p. 44). As Gourevitch (1998) points out, “If you were a bureaucrat with a foreign
aid budget to unload, and your professional success was…measured by your ability not to
lie or gloss too much when you filed happy statistical reports at the end of each fiscal
year, Rwanda was the ticket” (p. 76).
Rwanda was seen as a tranquil country, in contrast to many other African
countries during the Cold War, so aid agencies poured money into Rwanda (Gourevitch,
1998, p. 76). Uvin (1998) asserts that the international community knew that preparations
for a genocide were underway: two major human rights reports from 1993 detailed
substantial arms distributions to the population, increasing anti-Tutsi rhetoric, the
existence of militia groups, and massacres of over 2,000 Tutsis (p. 84). Although it can
be argued that the international community did not know that genocide was going to
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occur, many human rights organizations, NGOs, and foreign agencies knew about the
systemic repression, racism, and violence towards the Tutsi, and did nothing about it
(Uvin, 1998, p. 86). This failure to hold the government and other parties accountable
helped reinforce structural violence in Rwanda.
Galtung (1969) contends that when a structure is threatened, those who benefit
from structural violence will try to protect the status quo (p. 179). This was seen in
Rwanda, when the structure was threatened by the civil war and the peace agreement that
would have created power sharing between the Hutus and Tutsis. As mentioned above,
the state controlled all sectors of the economy and prescribed social behaviors; in
addition, the Catholic Church was closely affiliated with the state, as many church
leaders belonged to Habyarimana’s political party (Uvin, 1998, p. 22). The lack of
separation between the church and the state meant that there was no large opposition
movement, and the churches helped make the genocide possible by making genocidal
violence understandable and acceptable to the population, as well as teaching obedience
to authority (Longman, 2001, p. 166). As stated earlier in this chapter, in the early 1990s,
calls for reform of the churches came from both Hutu and Tutsi, which led to many
church leaders being sympathetic to the genocide because it could help reinforce their
power and preserve their hold on their offices (Longman, 2001, p. 175). In addition,
many church leaders supported President Habyarimana, and thus saw the RPF invasion as
a threat to their power in terms of ethnicity, because they gained benefits from the elected
leaders, benefits that would disappear if the elected officials had to share power with
Tutsis (Longman, 2001, p. 179). The RPF was a threat to the present structure, and the
Arusha Accords would have meant the end of the akazu, something the members wanted
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to avoid at all costs. Therefore, the extremists within the government decided that the
extermination of all Tutsis in Rwanda was the best method for preserving the existing
structure.
In addition to his argument that those who benefit from the status quo will work
to preserve it, Galtung (1969) states that structural violence is used to threaten people into
subordination by informing them that if they do not behave, those in power will
reintroduce previous disagreeable structures (p. 172). This can clearly be seen in the case
of Rwanda. Before Habyarimana came to power, there were periodic massacres of Tutsis.
When Habyarimana took power, he declared a moratorium on Tutsi attacks, and called
for Rwandans to live in peace and work together for development (Gourevitch, 1998, p.
69). While Tutsis were repressed by being barred from the military, subjected to quota
rules, and by only being given rubber-stamp positions in Parliament, they were no longer
being harassed or killed (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 69-70).
This system was threatened in 1990, when Tutsi rebels invaded from Uganda and
demanded rights and power. Habyarimana and the akazu did not want to share power, so
they decided to reintroduce the disagreeable structure of allowing Tutsis to be massacred.
The government successfully argued that it was the legitimate representation of the Hutu
majority, and the sole defense against the Tutsi’s attempts to enslave the population
(Uvin, 1998, p. 26). By spreading propaganda that claimed the Tutsis wanted to rule
Rwanda and subjugate the Hutu, the government was maintaining that the Tutsis wished
to reintroduce the colonial system of forced labor for Hutus and the suppression of the
Hutu majority. The government called on the Hutu majority to protect themselves from
this fate by eliminating the Tutsis.
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As discussed earlier, the population was frustrated and angry about their living
situations and lack of opportunities. The government saw this, and successfully redirected
this anger from the authorities to the Tutsis, using the Tutsis as a scapegoat for all the
problems Rwanda was facing. This scapegoating, combined with the civil war, lead many
Hutus to see themselves as under attack by all Tutsis, which helped convince them that
they needed to kill the Tutsis in order to protect themselves and their families. Uvin
(1998) makes a strong argument for structural violence being a cause of the genocide in
Rwanda when he states:
…Structural violence lowers the barriers against the use of violence. As the norms
of society lose legitimacy, as people’s knowledge based is reduced to slogans, as
progress becomes a meaningless concept, as communities are riveted by conflict
and jealousy, as people’s sense of self-respect is reduced, and as segments of
society show their contempt for the rules of decency as well as for farmers, people
become increasingly unhampered by constraints on the use of violence to deal
with problems (p. 138).
Uvin (1998) claims that the systemic racism toward the Tutsis that occurred for
decades before the genocide helped persuade individuals to participate in the genocide (p.
216). The Tutsis were seen as having fixed differences in their history, character, and
moral, intellectual, and social attributes and roles (Uvin, 1998, p. 216). State reinforced
prejudice and discrimination against the Tutsis was revitalized in the early 1990s via hate
speech and periodic violence against the Tutsis, and the ideology became radicalized
(Uvin, 1998, p. 217). According to Uvin (1998), racist prejudice was a way for ordinary
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people subjected to structural violence to make sense of their predicament and explain
their misery by scapegoating the Tutsi (p. 217).
Uvin (1998) contends that without the RPF invasion, the Habyarimana regime
would have slowly fallen due to external and internal pressures and there would not have
been a genocide; however, the invasion was the ideal situation for the government to
restore its legitimacy, unite the population around it, and increase the levels of violence,
fear, and control in society (p. 220). The invasion by the RPF sparked fears in the
population, supported by the government, that the Tutsis wanted to dismantle the existing
structure and take Rwanda back to the previous disagreeable structure where the minority
Tutsis dominated the majority Hutus and subjugated them. To prevent this from
happening, the Hutu population had to kill all Tutsis in Rwanda; it was the duty of the
Hutus to defend their country and eliminate the Tutsi threat.
Structural violence can also be used to explain why genocide is occurring in
Darfur. When Sudan was a British colony, the British saw greater development potential
in the northern areas, and did not see Darfur as being able to contribute to the Sudanese
economy, with the exception of exporting cattle and gum (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 13).
This led to the British government severely under developing and neglecting the Darfur
region: in 1935, Darfur had one elementary school, one “tribal” elementary school and
two “sub-grade” schools for a population of six million. Education was restricted to the
sons of chiefs, so that British authority could not be undermined by better-educated
Sudanese administrators or merchants. The British also neglected health care: there was
no maternity clinic before the 1940s, and Darfur had the lowest number of hospital beds
of any province-0.57 per thousand people (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 13). After
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independence, the Sudanese government did not treat the population much better- the
main complaint among Darfuris in the 1980s was that the government in Khartoum was
not treating them as full citizens of the state, and that villages had scarcely better services
than during colonialism (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 16).
As mentioned above, the situation did not improve after independence. The
successive governments in Khartoum neglected Darfur: there are a lack of schools,
hospitals, and paved roads in Darfur. According to Prunier (2008), in the 1980s, the water
system in El-Fasher, the capital of Darfur, was so tainted that the people living there were
becoming sick from the sewage in the water (p. 50). In addition to water supply
problems, a major famine hit Darfur in the 1980s, and was at first ignored by the
government. The Minister of Finance publicly dismissed the reports of famine, calling
them an exaggeration, and when Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps started
appearing near Khartoum, the government responded by claiming they were all refugees
from Chad and forcibly deported them by truck back to Darfur (Prunier, 2008, p. 51).
Omar al-Bashir also angered the various ethnic groups in Darfur when he made an
agreement with Muammar Gaddafi, the leader of Libya, to allow Libya to use Darfur as a
back-door entrance during Libya’s war with Chad in exchange for weapons (Flint & de
Waal, 2005, p. 25).
When Omar al-Bashir and the National Islamic Front (NIF) came to power in
1989, they made it clear that they favored the Arab groups over the African ones. When
the amount of arable land began to decrease due to overgrazing and desertification, the
African groups, largely farmers, began to restrict access to their land, which angered the
Arabs, who needed the land to water their camels and other animals (Marlowe, Bain, &
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Shapiro, 2006, p. 108). In response to the conflict, the government armed the Arab
groups and encouraged them to take the land from the farmers by force (Marlowe et al.,
2006, p.108).
This favoritism led to resentment among the African groups, which in turn led to
the formation of rebel groups and a civil war beginning in 2003. The rebel groups
demanded equal sharing of resources and development in Darfur (Marlowe et al., 2006,
p. 113). Marlowe et al. (2006) sum up the government’s position perfectly:
Omar Bashir’s government is drawn from a small number of elite tribes from the
Khartoum area in northern Sudan. The regime is largely unpopular with the vast
majority of Sudanese citizens, no matter the ethnicity. As with many small
governments resting on a small power base and trying to retain control, it relies on
chaos in order to survive, certainly in order to justify its oppressive measures (pp.
68-69).
In order to fight the rebels, the government armed Arab tribes, giving them a
monthly payment of 150,000 Sudanese pounds a day, plus 20,000 pounds a day for a
horse or camel, and promised them they could keep any loot they could carry (Flint & de
Waal, 2005, p. 40). These armed militias became known as the Janjaweed or Janjawid,
roughly translated as “devils on horseback” (Prunier, 2008, p. 65). The government in
Khartoum has no desire to change the social, political, and economic structures of Sudan,
which heavily favor the Arabs and an elite group in Khartoum, so it has resorted to
violence, slavery, and genocide in order to stay in power.
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Dehumanization
It has been argued that perpetrators of genocide are evil, “monsters”, sadistic,
mentally ill, etc. However, as mentioned previously, Waller (2002) argues that it was
ordinary individuals who commit extraordinary evil (p. 18). After the Holocaust, some
psychiatrists studied the brains of top Nazis awaiting trial, to see if it could be proved that
the Nazis were insane (Waller, 2002, p. 58). Psychiatrists administered IQ tests and the
Rorschachs test to test sanity and for mental illnesses; the results showed that with the
exception of one individual, the Rorschachs tests showed all Nazi defendants were sane,
and most fell into the superior to very superior range on the IQ tests (Waller, 2002, pp.
58-61). Thus, the argument that perpetrators are insane, evil, or mentally deficient has
been disproved.
Although the argument that perpetrators are mentally unstable is not a valid one,
there are some psychological adaptations human beings make that can lead to
participation in genocide (Waller, 2002, p. 152). For example, humans can be taught
xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and desire for social dominance for the group they belong to
(Waller, 2002, pp. 152-153). In addition, Waller argues that perpetrators have to
rationalize the extreme acts they are carrying out, and can do so by placing individuals
and groups outside the border in which moral rules and values apply (p. 186). By
justifying their actions, perpetrators can remove their own moral imperative against
killing, and can even defend their actions as moral (Waller, 2002, p. 186). Waller claims
that there are three binding factors on groups that apply to perpetrator groups: 1.
Diffusion of responsibility so each person is only responsible for a small part of the act;
2. Deindividuation, or the state in which a person cannot be identified as a specific

57
individual, but only as a member of the group (for example, seeing a Tutsi not as
individual X, but only as a Tutsi); and 3. Conformity to pressure, which is when an
individual will conform so he/she is liked and accepted by other people and will not be
subjected to punishment or ridicule (pp. 212-219).
Waller (2002) also examines dehumanization and its impact on the killers. He
claims that victims are first deprived of their identity via defining them by a category
such as ethnic group, and then they are excluded from the community of the human
family (pp. 244-245). Perpetrators regard victims as beings outside the moral universe of
humans, and use linguistic dehumanization on the victims, such as calling Jews “vermin”,
and “parasites” and calling Tutsis “cockroaches” (Waller, 2002, pp. 246-247). Waller
argues that dehumanization is also carried out by reducing victims to statistics, such as
stating how many people were killed, tortured, etc.; individuals go from having separate
identities and stories to being lumped into the category of victims and having their lives
reduced to facts and figures (p. 247). An interesting assertion made by Waller is that
people-not just perpetrators, but also individuals inside and outside the community-will
blame the victim for what happens to them (p. 250). Waller argues that we do this
because although we know bad things happen to good people, we do not wish to
relinquish our belief that the world is a fair and just place; therefore, we blame the
victims by asking why they did not leave or fight back, or by casting aspersions on their
character (p. 250). This can be seen in Darfur, where rape victims have been blamed for
their attack or cast out by their families and communities. Blaming the victim is a form of
dehumanization, albeit one that we do not recognize we are doing.
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Like Waller, Moshman (2005) claims that it is “…crucial to our self-conceptions
to see ourselves as fundamentally different from the perpetrators. Thus we are reassured
by simplistic theories that present the perpetrators as evil beings in the grip of genocidal
hatred” (p. 192). Moshman (2005) defined genocidal hatred as a murderous hate directed
at a racial, ethnic, national, cultural, political, or other abstract group based on a person’s
affiliation with the hated group rather than their individual characteristics (pp. 186-187).
In his short article, Moshman (2005) explored the genocide in Rwanda and the Nazi
death camp Treblinka to see how hatred played a role in each genocidal act. Hatred has
been emphasized in Rwanda; western accounts of the genocide called up an image of
ancient tribal hatreds, and Simon Bikindi’s song “I Hate Hutus”, a song attacking
moderate Hutus in Rwanda, has been used as an example to support the argument that
hatred played a role in the killings (Moshman, 2005, pp. 188-190).
Moshman (2005) claims that the emphasis on hatred in Rwanda deflects attention
away from other bases for genocide and impedes the creation of more complex theories
on why genocide occurs (p. 190). Instead of hatred, Moshman (2005) asserts that in
Rwanda, the genocide was partially political due to Rwanda’s history, as well as
psychological elements (pp. 188-189). When Moshman (2005) examined Treblinka, he
looked at what the camp commander Franz Stangl said in a series of interviews done in
prison after the war (p. 192). Contrary to popular belief, Stangl claimed that he did not
hate the Jews. Instead, he saw them as cargo or like a herd of cows: when he was on a
train in Brazil, he saw cattle at a slaughterhouse looking trustingly at the people on the
train; this reminded him of how the Jews looked in Poland just before they entered the
transport trains (Moshman, 2005, p. 193). Moshman (2005) argues that dehumanization
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is different from hate, because hatred makes it possible to kill those we see as people,
whereas genocide makes it possible to kill without hating, as a farmer might kill a cow (p.
194).
Moshman (2005) concludes his article by contending that genocidal hatred is not
a driving force for genocide; it does exist, but dehumanization may be a more important
basis for genocide (p. 206). Hatred is an attitude towards a person or group, whereas
dehumanization is a process of placing a person or group outside the realm of personhood
and outside the universe of moral obligation (Moshman, 2005, p. 206). Moshman (2005)
is correct when he points out that we (humans) tend to overemphasize the role of hatred
in genocide because we want to see perpetrators as very different from ourselves, instead
of as individuals who are the same as us but were convinced to take part in genocide (p.
207). According to Moshman (2005), what we need is a theory that explains how
ordinary individuals can come to commit genocide (p. 207).
As mentioned previously in the chapter, David Livingstone Smith (2011) explores
why human beings dehumanize one another, and how dehumanization has been used
throughout history. Smith (2011) defines dehumanization as “…the act of conceiving of
people as subhuman creatures rather than as human beings” (p. 26). Smith (2011) points
out that committing violence against a person does not make the person subhuman, but
perceiving people as subhuman often makes them the objects of violence and victims of
degradation (p. 28). Smith (2011) makes a connection between outgroup bias and
dehumanization when he states that outgroup bias is when individuals favor members of
their own community and discriminate against outsiders, as well as seeing members of
their own group as more industrious, diligent, etc. (p.49). Smith (2011) brings up the
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point that dehumanization is used in war, because war cannot occur unless members of
one group are willing to go out and kill members of another group, and, in order to be
able to do so, the group needs to see the outsiders as subhuman (pp. 60-61). Smith (2011)
argues that people are innately biased against outsiders, and this bias is used in
propaganda to motivate individuals to kill each other; thus, while dehumanization is a
cultural process and not a biological one, it rides on our innate biases in order to be
effective (p. 71).
Smith (2011) describes the dehumanization process as a two-step process. The
first step is for the target group to be seen as a distinct kind of persons, ones who are
radically different from the other group; the second step is to attribute a subhuman
essence to the group (Smith, 2011, p. 186). Smith claims that dehumanizers always
identify their victims with animals associated with violence, for example, rats or
cockroaches, animals that need to be exterminated (p. 223). This is seen in Darfur with
the government’s attitude that the African groups as savage and backwards, and by the
constant referral to black Sudanese as “dogs, monkeys, and slaves” (Prunier, 2008).
Seeing dehumanized individuals as animals that can contaminate other humans arouses
feelings of disgust and repels an individual from the targeted group (Smith, 2011, p. 252).
This is necessary for genocide to succeed, as individuals need to be convinced that the
targeted group should be exterminated, and individuals who will not actively take part in
the killings will at least passively stand by and not intervene.
Like Smith, Goldhagen (2009) examines the role of dehumanization in genocide,
and the effect is has on the perpetrators. Goldhagen (2009) claims that if people want to
understand and explain why the perpetrators killed, then they must first recognize that
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perpetrators approve of what they are doing (p. 189). According to Goldhagen (2009), by
their very actions, perpetrators imprint on their victims’ bodies and psyches that they are
worthless or vile beings who brought this fate upon themselves (p. 183). Goldhagen
believes that one of the least understood aspects of participation in genocide is how
people make the transition from the initial stage of dehumanizing language to one of
actually eliminating the targeted group (p. 342). Tutsi survivors recounted that people
would shout “look at that cockroach” or “look at that snake” when they passed by; calling
the Tutsis a snake implied that they were dangerous, poisonous animals that needed to be
killed (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 353). In Darfur, the Janjaweed refer to their victims as dogs,
monkeys, slaves, etc. This casual use of dehumanizing language helped smooth the path
to genocide.
Goldhagen (2009) states that the perpetrators’ ease in convincing themselves that
they are justified in doing to the victims what they believe the victims would have done
to them demonstrates human beings’ vulnerability to prejudices and hate ideologies (pp.
442-443). In the case of Rwanda, the anti-Tutsi propaganda spread by the government
and news outlets such as RTLM repeatedly warned the Hutus that the Tutsis were
planning to take over Rwanda and murder all Hutus; therefore, they must kill the Tutsis
before they could kill them. This kill or be killed belief, combined with systemic
dehumanization of the Tutsis, facilitated participation in the genocide. In Darfur, the
government has convinced the Janjaweed that the African tribes need to be removed
from the land because the Arabs are the rightful owners of Darfur.
The arguments made by Waller (2002), Moshman (2005), Smith (2011), and
Goldhagen (2009) are supported by Hatzfeld’s (2003) book on the perpetrators. Many of
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the perpetrators described the killings as work or a job (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 15). Pio, one of
the killers, described killing a neighbor and recalled that “In truth, it only came to me
afterward: I had killed a neighbor. I mean, at the fatal instant I did not see in him what he
had been before; I struck someone who was no longer close or strange to me, who wasn’t
exactly ordinary anymore…” (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 24). Some of the other participants
stated that they struck people with their machetes without seeing their faces, that they
were surprised by the speed of the death, and that they felt the strain of the effort of
killing somebody with a machete, but no personal pain (Hatzfeld, 2003).
In addition, the killers described the Tutsis as animals, as something to throw
away with no more meaning to them, and that the Tutsi were prey that they were hunting
(Hatzfeld, 2003). Pancrace used hunting language when describing killing Tutsis in a
marsh to Hatzfeld (2003): at first, it was easy because people were scared and not moving
around a lot, but then the Tutsi were “…picking up all the tricks of the marsh game
creatures…. Even the hunters grew discouraged” (p. 61). Aldabert told Hatzfeld (2003)
that when the group spotted some Tutsis running away from the marshes, they would call
them snakes because of the way they wriggled in the mud, or dogs, because many
Rwandans did not like dogs (p. 152). Some of the perpetrators informed Hatzfeld (2003)
that it was not possible to spare a friend or neighbor, as someone who came along after
them would kill the person, and might do so in a slower or crueler manner (pp. 119-120).
Conclusion
This first part of this chapter focused on the literature on Rwandan and Darfur
history, why genocide occurs, explanations for participation in genocide, rape in
genocide, and the search for justice in post-genocide Rwanda. I then explored two
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theories that help facilitate our understanding of why genocide has occurred in both
countries: structural violence and dehumanization. The literature, as well as the theories,
will be woven throughout chapters four and five. In the next chapter, I will describe how
the qualitative method of case study research will be used to explain the effects of
physical and sexual dehumanization in the Rwandan and Darfur genocides.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Chapter Introduction
In this chapter, I will explain the qualitative research methodology I used for this
study, which is case study. I used Yin’s (2009) book on case study to outline what case
study is, and how a case study is conducted, including the steps done before starting the
research and the collection of the evidence. I will end the chapter with a discussion of
how I collected and analyzed the data and the steps taken to ensure rigor.
What is case study?
According to Yin (2009), case study is a research method that allows researchers
to look at the complete and meaningful characteristics of real-life events (p. 4). In this
dissertation, the real-life events are the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. A more formal
definition of case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). In both
Rwanda and Darfur, dehumanization facilitated the genocide, and it is difficult to
separate dehumanization from the events of each genocide.
Case Study Research Design
Yin (2009) explains that there are five components of a research design for case
study; these are a study’s questions, its propositions, the unit of analysis, logic linking the
data to the propositions, and the criteria for interpreting the findings (p. 27). The study’s
questions are the “how”, “why”, “where”, etc., that are important to narrowing down the
topic (Yin, 2009, p. 27). As mentioned in chapter one, the research questions for this
study are: What are the various types of dehumanization found in both genocides, and
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what was/is their impact on the genocide? How was/is dehumanization spread in these
countries? When genocide ends, what steps can we take to re-humanize both the victims
and killers? Thus, the scope of this dissertation is limited to the role dehumanization has
played in both genocides, as well as the types, their dissemination, and what can be done
after a genocide to rehumanize both sides.
According to Yin (2009), the units of analysis means that those included in the
study must be distinguished from those outside the study (p. 32). In this study, the units
of analysis are Rwanda and Darfur, which excludes other cases of genocide such as the
Holocaust, and it focuses on dehumanization, therefore excluding other areas of study
such as participation in genocide. The units of analysis focus on the dehumanized groups
in both genocides, which necessarily excludes other populations within each country that
were not subjected to this. The final step Yin (2009) discusses is reliability, which is
conducting the case study so that a later researcher can follow the same procedures done
by the researcher and arrive at the same conclusions (p. 45). Yin (2009) rightly points out
that in order for the later researcher to do this, I must document each step of the process;
this is also necessary for me to replicate my own study in the future (p. 45). Before I
discuss my steps, I will briefly discuss the procedures that must be done before starting a
case study.
What to do before starting a case study
The first phase of the pre-case study protocol is to make sure the researcher is
asking the right questions while evaluating the evidence, to make sure they understand
why facts or events appear the way they do (Yin, 2009, p. 69). The second phase is
“listening”, which means not only reading and interpreting what is in the text, but also
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reading between the lines to see what significant information is not visible but is
nonetheless important to the study (Yin, 2009, p. 70). The third phase is adapting
procedures or plans if the research shifts or something unexpected happens; when a shift
occurs, I must repeat and re-document any of the steps already done (Yin, 2009, p. 71).
The fourth phase is making sure I have a firm grasp of the issues being studied, or I could
miss some deviations, such as contradictory information (Yin, 2009, pp. 71-72). I have
been studying both Rwanda and Darfur for over ten years now, and I studied both cases
in my Master’s Thesis, so I met this criterion. Finally, Yin (2009) points out that the
researcher must avoid bias: because I selected two cases I am familiar with, I could have
made the mistake of collecting research that supports my pre-conceived notions of what
has happened in both cases (p. 72). This issue will be discussed in more detail later on in
this chapter.
Type of case study used
There are many different types of case study that can be used. For my dissertation,
I used multiple case design. The reason for this is that I wanted to compare and contrast
two cases of genocide where both physical and sexual dehumanization were strongly
used, to understand how dehumanization is used to facilitate genocide. Yin (2009) states
that multiple case study is seen as more robust, but each case needs to be selected so they
either predict similar results or predict contrasting results that are anticipated (pp. 53-54).
Both Rwanda and Darfur should predict similar results. Multiple case study must contain
literal replication, which is the conditions where the phenomenon is likely to be found,
and theoretical replication, which is the conditions where the phenomenon is not likely to
be found (Yin, 2009, p. 54).
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In addition, each case study is considered a whole case study, with each case’s
conclusions being the information needing replication in the other cases (Yin, 2009, p.
56). In this study, the results from Rwanda regarding physical and sexual dehumanization
needed to be replicated in the Darfur case study. I only utilized two case studies, as the
theories I used are straightforward and do not need an excessive degree of certainty (Yin,
2009, p. 58). In other words, there is enough evidence that using Rwanda and Darfur will
lead to replication between the two cases, thus another case is not necessary.
Yin (2009) created a very useful chart explaining the steps of a multiple case
study project. The first step is to develop a theory you want the cases to explore; next,
you have to choose the cases (p. 57). I tested the theory of dehumanization and its impact
on genocide, and I chose Rwanda and Darfur because they are similar cases, yet there are
enough differences to warrant exploring how physical and sexual dehumanization played
a role in both genocides. After you have selected the cases, you must conduct the first
case study, write the individual case report, and then repeat these steps with the second
case study and any subsequent cases (Yin, 2009, p. 57).
After the case reports have been written, the researcher has to draw cross-case
conclusions, modify the theory as necessary, develop the policy implications, and write
the cross-case report (Yin, 2009, p. 57). Yin (2009) explains that the simplest form of
multiple-case study is one with literal replication; that is, cases where you know the
outcomes and you are focusing on how and why these outcomes occurred (p. 59). I know
the outcome of the Rwandan genocide, but the Darfur genocide is still ongoing. However,
since most of the violence occurred between 2004-2006, I believed that I could use this

68
case despite its uncertain future, by focusing on this three-year time span and including
policy recommendations for ending the genocide.
Collecting Case Study Evidence
After selecting the cases and doing the pre-case study steps outlined by Yin
(2009), I started collecting the evidence I needed for this dissertation. According to Yin
(2009), the sources of evidence for case study include: documentation, archival records,
interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artifacts (p. 102).
Due to the fact that I did a content analysis study, I did not conduct interviews or observe
the populations. I did collect documentation, archival records, and interviews done with
survivors and perpetrators by other scholars and journalists. However, as Yin (2009)
points out, documents may not always be accurate or unbiased (p. 103). Therefore, he
recommends corroborating any documents with other sources that verify spellings, titles,
and names of organizations mentioned in a document, provide specific details that
validate the evidence in another document, and provide information you can make an
inference from (p. 103). In addition, Yin (2009) recommends the use of multiple sources
in order to address a broader range of issues, as well as assisting with triangulation (pp.
115-116). Triangulation occurs when the events or facts of the case study have been
supported by more than one source of data (Yin, 2009, p. 116). I collected evidence from
various sources, including books, journal articles, NGOs, and news articles. I used
reputable news sources, such as the BBC, and internationally recognized NGOs such as
Human Rights Watch, Doctors without Borders, and Amnesty International, to ensure
reliability and validity.
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Analyzing the evidence
Yin (2009) outlines four general strategies for analyzing the case study evidence;
the first is to follow the theoretical propositions that led to the case study, the second is to
develop a descriptive framework for organizing the case study, the third is to use both
qualitative and quantitative data, and the fourth is to look at rival explanations (pp. 130134). I spent several months collecting data for this dissertation. I looked for sources on
genocide in general; information specifically on Rwanda and Darfur; general
explanations of dehumanization; broad information on dehumanization in genocide; and
specific information on dehumanization in Rwanda and Darfur. While I collected the
evidence, I followed Yin’s advice in step 1, to follow my theoretical proposition. I
theorized that physical and sexual dehumanization were/are widely spread throughout the
populations in both genocides, and that the various types used facilitated support for, or
participation in, each genocide. I have also theorized that rape in both cases was/is an act
of genocide. Keeping this in mind, I read and re-read each source with my theoretical
framework in mind, looking for phrases or words that supported my theory.
In terms of the second step, I had an initial set of research questions that I kept in
the back of my head as I collected and read my sources. I looked for certain keywords,
such as dehumanization, rape, and genocide. When I did a search for “physical
dehumanization”, I was able to find sources, but when I sought information on “sexual
dehumanization”, the results were surprisingly limited. Almost no sources mention sexual
dehumanization specifically, although many sources did include elements of sexual
dehumanization in their writings. This may be the case because sexual dehumanization is
a relatively new term, or there may not be much literature on it. The term rape was found
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in many sources, but I made sure to read each one thoroughly to ensure that rape was
mentioned multiple times, not just once or twice. I also included the words “racism” and
“race” in my search for literature on Sudan, as systemic racism against the so-called
African groups in Darfur and other parts of Sudan has existed for many decades and
contributes to the physical dehumanization of the targeted groups. This yielded some
useful sources. As I read and marked up each source, I began to formulate a descriptive
framework for how to structure my case studies. I made the decision to start each case
with physical dehumanization, and then transition into discussing sexual dehumanization.
The reason for this is because there is a fair amount of research done on physical
dehumanization, but very little on sexual dehumanization, so I wanted to focus more
attention on this aspect of genocide.
For step 3, using both qualitative and quantitative data, I did include some
quantitative sources, but the majority of my research was qualitative. The reason for this
is that while the quantitative studies I used provided helpful information, they lacked the
ability to fully explain the “how” and “why” of physical and sexual dehumanization.
Quantitative studies have been done on dehumanization using experiments that prove that
humans in general dehumanize each other, depending on the circumstances. However, in
terms of genocide, while quantitative research can provide a breakdown of numbers on
topics such as how many people participated in a genocide, the number of people killed
in an area, etc., they do not provide an explanation for why people participated or why
people were killed in one area, but not another. Qualitative research that included
interviews with perpetrators and survivors provided the best insight for me into how
dehumanization was/is used in both cases. Qualitative research done on rape in general
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and rape in genocide specifically helped bolster my analysis of sexual dehumanization
and how rape is an act of genocide. While a quantitative study on physical and sexual
dehumanization can be done, I chose to do a qualitative study because I believe it
provided me with a more robust, well rounded dissertation.
As mentioned above, Yin’s (2009) final step for analyzing case study evidence is
to look at rival explanations for the phenomenon in question (p. 133). Some of the
literature I used in this dissertation argued that what is happening in Darfur is not
genocide, because it does not meet the criterion of intentionality. While I disagree, I did
not let that affect my analysis of the literature, as the authors made several good points
about an aspect of the events in Darfur that I found useful for this study. I also kept in
mind that the labeling of Darfur as “genocide” has been contentious; while the U.S. and
several other countries have used this term, many others, including most Middle East
countries, do not. Thus, I could not ignore or refuse to include literature on Darfur that
did not call the events genocide. Another rival explanation is that rape in genocide is not
different from rape in war or rape in general, and therefore, does not merit special
attention. While I understand this argument to some extent, I respectfully disagree. I
believe that rape in genocide is different, because the intentionality is different; I will
expand on this point in chapters four and five.
As I was analyzing the evidence, I had to determine what type of analytic
technique I wanted to use. After reading about the different types in Yin’s (2009) book, I
decided to use explanation building (p. 141). In explanation building, “… the case study
evidence is examined, the theoretical positions are revised and the evidence is once again
examined from a new perspective…” (Yin, 2009, p. 143). Explanation building wants to
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explain how or why something has happened, using a significant theoretical proposition;
in other words, the explanation might provide insights into social science theory, which
in turn can lead to recommendations for future policy actions (Yin, 2009, p. 141).
The purpose of this dissertation is to explain how physical and sexual
dehumanization are used in genocide, and my hope was to offer some recommendations
for how to stop the spread of physical and sexual dehumanization in a country that is on
the brink of genocide or where a genocide has just begun, as well as ideas on how to
rehumanize not just the victims, but also the perpetrators. Therefore, explanation building
was the best analytic technique to use for this study. However, as Yin (2009) points out,
the danger of using explanation building is that the researcher may begin to drift away
from the original topic; to counter this, I followed his advice to constantly refer to the
purpose of this study (p. 144).
To ensure that my analysis is rigorous and of a high quality, I followed the four
steps Yin (2009) outlined. Step 1 is that you show that you exhaustively covered your
main research questions; the analysis should show how the study used as much evidence
as possible, while leaving no loose ends (p. 160). I did this by conducting an extensive
literature review on my topic, using variations of keywords and phrases in order to find as
much literature as possible to support my study. The evidence was analyzed and then
reanalyzed in order to ensure that important information was not missed. I also made sure
to look for any inferred information in each document. Step 2 is to address, if possible, all
the major rival explanations (pp. 160-161). As mentioned above, I did include sources
that argued Darfur is not genocide, and that rape in genocide should not be treated
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differently from rape in war or in general. These rival explanations will be explored in
more detail in the following chapters.
Step 3 is to make sure that your analysis addresses the most significant aspect of
your case study (p. 161). The most important aspects of my case study are physical and
sexual dehumanization, and my analysis covered these aspects in great detail. I made sure
to keep in mind what the purpose of this study was, so that my analysis would not
meander or leave the reader confused as to what the study was about. Step 4 is to use
your own prior knowledge in your case study (p. 161). As mentioned earlier, I have been
studying the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur for over ten years now, and I used both
genocides as cases in my Master’s Thesis. I have written papers on different aspects of
the genocides, such as the role of the media in the Rwandan genocide. This prior
knowledge has been very beneficial, as it allowed me to focus my literature searches on
specific aspects of each genocide, due to the fact that I already had literature on the
history of each genocide. Being familiar with both cases also meant that I would not get
bogged down in attempting to understand the intricacies of both cases, which can be time
consuming. When I was first learning about both genocides, I had to spend a large
amount of time ensuring that I knew both cases in detail, including how the genocides
started, who participated in the genocide, what the international response was/is, and how
the genocide ended in the case of Rwanda. Having this knowledge already made finding
the most useful sources much easier, as it meant that I could discard sources with
inaccurate information, which would have been detrimental to my study.
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Chapter Conclusion
This chapter explored the methodology used in the dissertation. I explained what
case study is, how it is conducted, and the type of case study I used. I outlined how my
case study was carried out, including the collection and analyzing of literature. Having
explained the methodology, I will now describe both cases in great detail in chapter four
and five. Chapter four will look at physical and sexual dehumanization in the Rwandan
genocide, while chapter five will explore physical and sexual dehumanization in Darfur.
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Chapter 4: Case Study Rwanda
Chapter Introduction
In this chapter, I will examine the physical and sexual dehumanization that
occurred in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. I will start the chapter off with a brief overview
of the genocide, in order to provide the reader with a context. Next, I will look at the
various types of physical dehumanization used in Rwanda and how structural violence
facilitated the dehumanization. After that, I will explore sexual dehumanization,
including the mass rape and torture of women during the genocide. Lastly, I will
conclude the chapter with a summation of the previous sections and final thoughts on
dehumanization in general in Rwanda.
Overview of Rwandan Genocide
During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus
were murdered in 100 days. This equated to around 8,000 a day, which meant around 333
lives lost per hour, or around 5 lives per minute (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 133). Those who
took part in the killings included doctors, teachers, farmers, and members of the clergy.
According to Gourevitch (1998), neighbors killed neighbors in their homes, doctors
killed patients, and teachers killed students in hospitals and schools all across Rwanda (p.
115). As mentioned in chapter 1, the killings were highly organized: members of the
Interahamwe prepared small groups in neighborhoods, as well as drawing up lists of
Tutsis to be executed and organizing retreats where members practiced burning houses
and hacking up dummies with machetes (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 94-95). The media,
including Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), disseminated anti-Tutsi
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propaganda, such as calling Tutsis “cockroach” and reminding listeners not to take pity
on women and children and kill every Tutsi in Rwanda (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 115).
The reasons for why the genocide occurred are complex, and the genocide cannot
be described as the result of ancient tribal hatred. However, there are historical aspects to
the genocide, including the legacy of colonialism. The Belgians were the colonial rulers
in Rwanda after World War 1, and the Belgians saw the Tutsi as “racially superior”,
based on the idea of race science and the supposedly superior features of the Tutsis,
including being taller and having longer, thinner noses (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 52). The
colonizers put the Tutsis into positions of power over the majority ethnic Hutus. The
Belgians issued identity cards based on ethnicity and used them for job and school
placements (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 56-57). The Hutus were denied education and job
opportunities, forced to do communal work, and taught that they were racially “inferior”
to the Tutsis.
When Rwanda gained its independence in 1959, the Tutsis were removed from
power, and Hutu leaders were elected. Massacres against the Tutsis began in 1959, as
Rwanda was taking steps towards becoming an independent country. The killings often
happened without any government intervention to stop the killings or punish those
responsible, which helped lay the foundations for the 1994 genocide. In 1973, Juvenal
Habyarimana overthrew the government and formed a dictatorship, with a small group of
Hutus close to his family running the country. During his dictatorship, attacks against the
Tutsi decreased, although the Tutsis had little rights under the regime, and were banned
from the military. Most Tutsi were willing to live with the restrictions, though, in
exchange for some security and peace (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 69).

77
The fragile security in Rwanda was shattered when the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990. The RPF called for the right of the
Tutsis living outside Rwanda, including refugees from previous killings, to be allowed to
return to the country. In addition, the RPF wanted a power-sharing government between
the Hutus and Tutsis. President Habyarimana agreed to negotiate with the RPF in 1993,
and the Arusha Accords were signed in Tanzania to end the war and set up a multi-party
system in Rwanda; the Arusha Accords also led to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping
force to monitor and enforce the peace agreement. President Habyarimana’s acquiescence
to the Arusha Accords was seen as a traitorous act by Hutu extremists, who began calling
for his death. On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana and the president of Burundi
were assassinated when the plane they were in was shot down over Kigali (Gourevitch,
1998, p. 110). Almost immediately, the killings began.
Despite the presence of UN soldiers, the international community did little to
respond to the killings. The UN left a force of only 300 soldiers to mandate the peace
agreement, which meant that the peacekeepers were not allowed to intervene in killings.
The UN withdrew most of the troops after 10 Belgian peacekeepers were tortured and
killed by Hutu militias. This led to Belgium withdrawing all of its troops, and the US,
still haunted by the death of its soldiers in Mogadishu, calling for a complete withdrawal
of the UN peacekeeping force, despite the fact that Romeo Dallaire’s call for an
expanded peacekeeping force would not have required American troops (Gourevitch,
1994, p. 150). The US government also refused to categorize the killings as genocide,
because it believed that doing so would force the US to take military action (Gourevitch,
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1998, p. 153). The violence ended only after the RPF was successfully able to overthrow
the government in July 1994 (Gourevitch, 1994, p. 162).
Facilitation of Physical Dehumanization
While some have argued that the genocide in Rwanda was the result of chaos and
anarchy, Gourevitch (1998) rightly points out that the genocide was the outcome of an
authoritarian, organized, and meticulously ruled state (p. 95). Gourevitch (1998) further
argues that genocide requires great ambition and needs to be conceived as the means to
achieving a new order (p. 17). In addition, Gourevitch (1998) claims that the organizers
and perpetrators of genocide do not need to enjoy killing, but above everything else, want
their victims dead so badly that they consider it a necessity (p. 18). Mob rule may work
temporarily in genocide, but there needs to be some factor that motivates people to
participate day after day, to keep killing after the first victim (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 17).
Another common argument made is that genocide is a result of hatred, that the
perpetrators kill because they hate the victims. While this may be true in some cases,
Moshman (2005) points out that hatred can be manipulated for political reasons, and that
dehumanization is more likely to affect participation (p. 194). Moshman (2005) argues
that dehumanization makes it possible to kill a person without hating them; using the
analogy of killing a cow, he argues that it is possible to do so because you no longer see
the individual as human (p. 194).
Dehumanization played a large role in facilitating participation in the Rwandan
genocide. Dehumanizing rhetoric and language was spread by the media and the
government to persuade people to kill the Tutsis. The 1990 invasion by the RPF and
subsequent peace talks led the government to fear that their domination of the Rwandan
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economy and society would end when they would be forced to share power with the
Tutsis. As mentioned in chapter 2, about 15 percent of the farmers in Rwanda owned half
of the land (Uvin, 1998, p. 113), and in Butare, the richest 10 percent earned 66.4 percent
of the region’s income in 1992 (Uvin, 1998, p. 115). President Habyarimana’s wife
Agathe ran a small influential group called the akazu, or little house. The akazu
controlled the political, economic, and military muscle and the patronage that was
eventually called “Hutu Power” (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 80-81). If anyone crossed Agathe
or the akazu, they were assassinated or jailed (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 81). Thus, this group
was determined to prevent the power and resource sharing, and began planning to
eliminate the Tutsi.
One of the first steps taken toward dehumanization by the government was to
place the Tutsis in a different group from the Hutus, to make the Tutsis the “outgroup”
(Smith, 2011, p. 49). The Tutsis were seen as the “other,” creating an “us and them”
mentality (Smith, 2011, p. 49). When one group sees the other as separate, they begin to
discriminate against the outgroup, seeing them as deserving of their suffering, as less
hardworking, honest, etc. (Smith, 2011, p. 49). Moshman (2007) explains that identity in
Rwanda changed to the point where people were identified first and foremost as Hutu or
Tutsi, with all other identifiers being a distant second (p. 119). Moreover, Moshman
(2007) points out that if the outgroup is seen as something other than human, “…then
they cannot share interests, values, or commitments with ‘us’” (p. 123). The RPF
invasion in 1990 allowed the government to claim that all the Tutsis living in Rwanda
were RPF sympathizers and spies, and that, unlike the Hutus, they were traitors to their
country (Gourevitch, 1998). By labeling the Tutsis as traitors, the government was
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making it clear that any actions taken against them would not be punished, and might
even be rewarded.
Another common tactic used in dehumanization in fear; that is, creating a fear that
the other group is out to eliminate the ingroup. The Rwandan government used the
mirroring method, whereby the outgroup is accused of wanting to take actions that the
ingroup are actually preparing to do (Chrétien, 2007, p. 55). In other words, the Tutsis
were accused of wanting to kill all of the Hutus, when in fact the government was
preparing to slaughter all of the Tutsis. The 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the RPF led to
fears that the Tutsis planned to take back over the country and return the system to what
it was during the colonial era, when the Hutus were a repressed majority (Gourevitch,
1998). RTLM and newspapers like Kangura called on Hutus to take up arms to defend
themselves against the RPF and Tutsis living inside Rwanda (Gourevitch, 1998).
Gourevitch (1998) recounts that the government declared all Tutsis to be RPF
accomplices and stated that any Hutus who did not support this view would be viewed as
“Tutsi-loving traitors” (p. 83). In addition, Hassan Ngeze, the editor of Kangura, argued
that all Tutsi women were RPF agents and that all Tutsis were dishonest, and the Minister
of Justice during that time period argued that 99% of the Tutsis were pro-RPF
(Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 88; 98). The use of fear led many to see the situation as “kill or be
killed”, and many perpetrators justified their actions on the grounds of self-defense.
After establishing that the Tutsis were spies and traitors determined to take over
the country, the government began using dehumanizing language and rhetoric to instill in
the population a belief that the Tutsis were not like them, that they were not even human.
As Smith (2011) rightly points out,
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We are innately biased against outsiders. This bias is seized upon and
manipulated by propaganda to motivate men and women to slaughter one another.
This is done by inducing men to regard their enemies as subhuman creature,
which overrides their natural, biological inhibitions against killing (p. 71).
The popular radio station RTLM started the dehumanization process in a slow and subtle
manner. RTLM was popular because its announcers were quick witted, humorous, and at
times irreverent toward the government (Des Forges, 2007, p. 44). The station would
make funny jokes about the Tutsis, such as a suggestion to air mail Tutsis to Uganda
(Gourevitch, 1998). RTLM used the word inyenzi (cockroach) casually, which at first
shocked people but then led to them becoming accustomed to hearing, and even using,
the term to describe Tutsis (Gourevitch, 1998). RTLM increased their hateful rhetoric as
the government and RPF began negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania. According to Des
Forges (2007), RTLM announcers used the terms inyenzi and Tutsi interchangeably, also
using the term RPF, which lead the listeners to conclude that all the Tutsis were RPF
supporters; in addition, RTLM warned listeners that RPF soldiers would be dressed in
civilian clothes and encouraged listeners to look for any refugees who looked like they
might be disguised RPF members-essentially, anyone who was Tutsi (p. 48).
Unlike RTLM, Kangura immediately used anti-Tutsi rhetoric and language.
Hassan Ngeze, the newspaper’s editor, was hired by the government to write a newspaper
that supported the government and attacked the RPF and Tutsis (Gourevitch, 1998, p.
85). Ngeze published documents that he claimed showed that the RPF was part of a Tutsi
supremacist campaign to subjugate the Hutus and ran lists of names of Tutsis and Hutu
accomplices that were traitors to the government (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 86). Ngeze
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published the infamous “Hutu Ten Commandments,” which commanded Hutu men to
avoid marrying, befriending, or employing Tutsi women, prohibited Hutus from having
business dealings with Tutsis, and the most famous and oft-quoted commandment,
commandment 8, which declared that “Hutus must stop having mercy on the Tutsis”
(Gourevitch, 1998, p. 88). Ngeze promoted Hutu supremacy and used his critics’ attacks
to his advantage: Gourevitch (1998) describes an instance where a rival newspaper ran a
cartoon with Ngeze on a psychiatrist’s couch complaining that his sickness was the
Tutsis; Ngeze then ran the cartoon in Kangura (p. 87). Ngeze’s inflammatory rhetoric
made Kangura one of the most widely read newspapers, and certainly the one Rwandans
remember the most from that time period (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 87).
Both RTLM and Kangura used stereotypes of Tutsi features and mannerisms to
mark them as the outgroup. According to Gourevitch (1998), Tutsis were seen as
“…lanky and long-faced, not so dark-skinned, narrow-nosed, thin-lipped, and narrowchinned” (p. 50). Tutsis were also described as not eating often, preferring to drink milk
(Gourevitch, 1998, p. 209). While some Tutsis fit these stereotypical descriptions, such as
Rwandan President Paul Kagame who is very tall and thin, most Tutsis did not. After
generations of intermarriage between Hutus and Tutsis, neither group could accurately be
called distinct ethnic groups (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 45-46). Most distinction of Hutu vs.
Tutsi came from their roles in society: Tutsis were herders of cattle, and Hutus farmed the
land (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 48). However, the Belgians issued identity cards labeling
people as Hutu or Tutsi based on the attributed features of both groups, and after
independence, the government continued this practice, with the ethnicity of the father
determining the ethnicity of the children (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 57). While some
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individuals could change their identity via bribery or absence/death of the father, most
Rwandans were forced to keep the ethnicity assigned to them at birth (Gourevitch, 1998).
The Rwandan government facilitated the dehumanization of Tutsis for a variety of
reasons. First, the global prices of coffee and tea, Rwanda’s main exports, dropped
drastically in the late 1980s, causing major economic problems in the country (Uvin,
1998, p. 54). This meant that Rwanda had to increasingly rely on foreign aid, which came
with strings attached: the United States and many European countries demanded an
opening of the political system to include multiple political parties and open democracy
(Gourevitch, 1998, p. 82). President Habyarimana had no choice but to play along; he
allowed for the creation of opposition parties and newspapers, but often cracked down on
the opposition by arresting or killing politicians and editors (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 86).
Habyarimana knew that if he allowed for free and open elections, he would lose power,
along with the Akazu. According to Uvin (1998), before the genocide, in the province of
Butare, the richest 10 percent earned 66.4 percent of that region’s income; about 90
percent of the rural population lived below the poverty line, and the country was unable
to feed itself due to overpopulation and unequal land distribution (pp. 115-117).
The lack of economic opportunities for young people led to vast frustration, and it
did not help that the government limited the population’s mobility: residency and travel
permits were required to stay or move anywhere, to prevent slums in and around Kigali,
the capital (Uvin, 1998, pp. 115-116). Young men were trapped on plots of land that were
incapable of providing for a family, which meant that they could not get married, nor
could they seek an education or a better job (Uvin, 1998, p. 118). A young, frustrated and
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angry population could have spelled major trouble for the Habyarimana regime, but he
was saved when the RPF invaded in 1990.
The RPF invasion gave Habyarimana a convenient scapegoat for Rwanda’s
problems: the Tutsis that he claimed wanted to take back over the country and subjugate
the Hutus. Although many Tutsis in Rwanda were no better off than their Hutu
counterparts, the government was successfully able to convince Rwandans that the Tutsis
were dominating the economic sectors and preventing Hutus from improving their
situation. As Uvin (1998) points out,
When people are denied the realization of their full human and intellectual
potential, when they are deprived of choices and information, they are more easily
manipulated. When people are treated in a humiliating and prejudicial manner,
when they are made to lose their self-respect, the result in frustration and anger, as
well as a strong need to regain self-respect and dignity (p. 136).
Habyarimana and the Akazu knew that they would need to channel that anger and
frustration in another direction, away from them. Thus, they convinced the population
that the Tutsis were to blame for their problems, and that the RPF invasion meant that the
Tutsis planned to return Rwanda to the policies of the colonial times. The government did
not want to lose the structure they had built and sustained post-independence, so they
decided to remove the biggest threat to the structure, the Tutsis. As Uvin (1998) explains,
racism was a means for ordinary Rwandans to make sense of their predicament, of their
misery via projection and scapegoating (p. 217). Uvin (1998) also claims that
…Structural violence lowers the barriers against the use of violence. As the norms
of society lose legitimacy, as people’s knowledge base is reduced to slogans, as
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progress becomes a meaningless concept, as communities are riveted by conflict
and jealousy, as people’s sense of self-respect is reduced, and as segments of
society show their contempt for the rules of decency as well as for farmers, people
become increasingly unhampered by constraints on the use of violence to deal
with problems (p. 138).
The government of Rwanda prepared people for the use of violence by importing and
distributing machetes, creating the Interahamwe, drawing up lists of Tutsis to target, and
organizing retreats where militia members would practice burning houses, tossing
grenades, and hacking up dummies with machetes (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 93). Over the
course of at least two years, the government prepared its citizens to slaughter Tutsis
without mercy.
Physical Dehumanization
Tutsis as Animals
Arguably, the most famous dehumanizing term used against the Tutsi was inyenzi,
or “cockroach.” As Gourevitch (1998) explains, the Tutsi rebels were the first to be called
cockroaches, and they used the term themselves to “…describe their stealth and their
belief that they were uncrushable” (p. 64). However, as Higiro (2007) points out,
“cockroaches are annoying insects that disappear when somebody turns on the light. The
only way to get rid of them is to kill all of them” (p. 85). Having dealt with cockroaches
in my apartment, I agree with Higiro (2007). Most people see cockroaches as annoying,
ugly insects who must be wiped out.
The use of a repulsive creature to describe Tutsis made it easier to convince
people that all Tutsis, and not just the RPF, needed to be eliminated. Most people would
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not think twice about stomping on a cockroach to kill it; thus, reducing the Tutsis to
cockroaches helped remove the moral imperative against killing a fellow human being by
turning them into a creature that must be stamped out. Moreover, in order to get rid of a
cockroach infestation, you have to kill the eggs and larvae as well as the adult
cockroaches; RTLM reminded listeners of this fact when they informed them that “A
cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly, a cockroach gives birth to a cockroach…”
(Melvern, 2004, p. 50).
By using this analogy, RTLM was reminding the Interahamwe and perpetrators
not to leave any Tutsi children alive; in fact, RTLM went so far as to remind its listeners
to disembowel pregnant victims (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 98). The fact that use of the term
cockroach was widespread is demonstrated in Gourevitch (1998): Paul Rusesabagina, the
manager of the Hotel des Mille Collines told Gourevitch in an interview that a priest he
knew, Father Wenceslas, brought his elderly Tutsi mother to the hotel for safekeeping
and told him, “Paul, I bring you my cockroach” (p. 140-141).
In addition to calling Tutsis cockroaches, RTLM and newspapers like Kangura
referred to Tutsis as snakes and hyenas (Higiro, 2007, p. 87). According to Higiro (2007),
in Rwandan culture, a hyena is the worst animal, and calling someone a hyena labels
them a very bad person, one worthy of death (p. 85). Although dehumanization was used
by oppositional newspapers to depict Habyarimana’s supporters, its use was more
common in the pro-regime media (Higiro, 2007, p. 84). Kangura likened the RPF and its
supporters to “…a snake ready to devour Rwanda and oblivious Rwandans” (Kabanda,
2007, p. 68). Thomas Kamilindi (2007), a journalist who quit Radio Rwanda a few
months before the genocide because of its promotion of hatred, describes an encounter
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with the Interahamwe during the genocide: “I have a daughter. She’s twelve now but she
was very small at the time. One day, somebody said, ‘That one is a snake. They have to
kill her.’ She wasn’t even two years old. My daughter asked me, ‘Am I a snake? Am I a
snake?’” (p. 138). Depicting Tutsis as snakes reduced them to dangerous creatures that
had to be eliminated before they could harm anyone.
Samuel Totten and Rafiki Ubaldo (2011) conducted in-depth interviews with ten
Tutsi survivors about their experiences. One participant, Umulisa, remembered being
frightened by what she was reading in Kangura about Tutsis. She rightly points out that
by calling Tutsis animals that they had no connection to- instead of being called a lion,
which implies bravery-calling Tutsis snakes labeled them an animal that is very
dangerous and one people refuse to live with (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 46). Being
called a cockroach bothered her because “
…everyone hates them in Rwanda because they get in our cupboards, and you try to do
everything you can to get rid of them” (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 46). Another
participant, Emmanuel, shared a disturbing story about the killing of Tutsis in a school.
The killers tortured women and girls by slashing them with machetes and beating them
with weapons (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 46). The prefect of the community brought in
Caterpillar tractors to push piles of corpses into mass graves; some people were still
alive, and they had their limbs ripped off by the tractors (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 87).
Most disturbingly, while the tractors were operating, babies could be heard crying, and
older children were begging and crying out “Please forgive me! I will never again be a
Tutsi!” (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 87). A third participant, also named Emmanuel, was
hiding in a church when the Interahamwe arrived (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 118).
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Emmanuel managed to hide outside the church, but he watched as the killers threw
grenades into the church and shot bullets into it; the killers then checked to see who was
still alive and began killing them (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 119). A pregnant woman
was discovered and when she did not have enough money to satisfy the Interahamwe,
one of the militias said “...they wanted to see how Tutsi children looked when they are
still in the mother” (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 119). The woman was sliced open and the
fetus fell out; the mother screamed until she died (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 119).
Routinization of Killing
In addition to the constant reinforcement of the idea that Tutsis were not human,
RTLM used language to assure the Interahamwe and others participating in the genocide
that what they were doing was akin to working. Li (2007) explains that RTLM would
direct listeners to specific targets and hiding places, interviewed individuals working the
roadblocks, and included informational updates and operational details to help frame
work schedules and turn the killing into a routine (pp. 99-101). In addition, the killings
were carried out by individuals working in rotating shifts, with crew leaders at times
being elected (Li, 2007, p. 91). To incentivize this “work”, individuals were allowed to
loot Tutsi belongings and livestock, and a councilwoman in Kigali offered fifty Rwandan
francs for what was called “selling cabbages”, or bringing in severed Tutsi heads
(Gourevitch, 1998, p. 115).
French journalist Jean Hatzfeld (2003) interviewed perpetrators in Rwanda, and
they confirmed the routinization of killing. Several of his participants said “we had work
to do” (p. 15) when talking about the slaughter. Léopord, one of the participants, oversaw
his killing unit. He told Hatzfeld (2003) that he would whistle the men for assembly,
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hurry people up, count the missing, check on any reasons for absence, and pass along
instructions (p. 14). In many ways, Léopord’s job was similar to a manager or foreperson
at any regular job. Two other participants, Élie and Jean-Baptiste, told Hatzfeld (2003)
that they got no time off, not even on Sundays, and the local leaders lectured them on
their duties, threatened in advance anyone who ruined the job, and were told they had to
work all the way until the end, keep up a satisfactory pace, spare no one, and loot what
they found (p. 15).
As the genocide became routine, the participants began to kill without seeing who
they were striking, and if they killed someone they knew, for example a neighbor, they
“…did not see in him what he had been before; I struck someone who was no longer
either close or strange to me, who wasn’t exactly ordinary anymore…” (Hatzfeld, 2003,
pp. 21-24). The perpetrators also became desensitized to the killing over time, with Élie
telling Hatzfeld (2003) “In the end, a man is like an animal: you give him a whack on the
head or neck, and down he goes” (p. 37). The participants in Hatzfeld’s (2003) book also
used the term hunting when describing the tracking down of Tutsis to kill. They told
Hatzfeld (2003) that the perpetrators changed colors from hunting and that the hunt,
hunters and hunted were savage (p. 47). As Pancrace explains,
In the beginning the Tutsis were many and frightened and not very active-that
made our work easier. When we could not catch the most agile of them, we fell
back on the puny ones. But at the end only the strong and sly ones were left, and it
got too hard. They gathered in little groups, very well hidden. They were picking
up all the tricks of the marsh game creatures (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 61).
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The routinization of the killing, combined with seeing the Tutsis as creatures to be
hunted down and killed, made it easier for the perpetrators to kill them. Léopord
informed Hatzfeld (2003) that the killers no longer looked at the Tutsis on a one-on-one
basis, but as a collective group that represented a large threat to Rwanda, a threat that
must be eliminated (p.121). Although a killer might be able to avoid killing a neighbor or
friend, they could not save them from being killed by another member of their group; if
they avoided them, the next killer might kill them more slowly, and/or the perpetrator
who avoided killing them could be fined, thus the perpetrators did not even try to spare a
neighbor’s life (Hatzfeld, 2003, pp. 120-121). Adalbert told Hatzfeld (2003) that a group
member who wanted to save their Tutsi wife had to show great enthusiasm for the killing,
or she would be killed (p. 122). Adalbert also explained to Hatzfeld (2003) that if they
spotted a group of Tutsis trying to escape by crawling through the mud, they would call
them snakes; before the killings, they called the Tutsis cockroaches, but during, they
called them snakes or dogs (p. 132). Insulting their victims made it easier for some
perpetrators to kill, and when Tutsis were killed in marshes, their dirty appearance made
them seem completely different from the Hutus, which also made killing them easier
(Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 132).
In this section, I have explored physical dehumanization in Rwanda, including its
facilitation, the type of language used, and the routinization of killing. However, in
addition to the physical dehumanization, Tutsi women were subjected to sexual
dehumanization, which will be explained in great detail in the next section.
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Sexual Dehumanization
Overview of Rape as Genocide
During the Rwandan genocide, between 250,000-500,000 women and girls were
raped; the exact number is unknown, as many victims did not report their rape (Human
Rights Watch, 1996, p. 24). Before I discuss rape and sexual violence against women in
Rwanda, however, I feel it is important to provide a background on the idea of rape as an
act of genocide. Although rape is mentioned in the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, it
was not legally codified as such until the international tribunals for Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia (Fox, 2011, p. 287). Under the Geneva Conventions, rape was
considered a crime against a woman’s honor and was thus distinct from other crimes
against humanity, like torture and murder (Green, 2004, p. 99). It was not until the
international tribunals that rape was seen as an act of genocide. Allison Ruby ReidCunningham (2008) sums up rape as an act of genocide perfectly when she argues that
mass rape prevents births within the targeted group via damage to the reproductive
capabilities or the social fitness of women (p. 281). Reid-Cunningham (2008) also rightly
points out that rapes committed against women in the target group in a widespread and
systematic fashion represents an assault on the community as a whole (p. 281).
As well as symbolizing as assault on an entire community, mass rape also tells the
men of that community that they are unable to protect their women, thus adding to the
shame of the community (Reid-Cunningham, 2008, p. 282). Christopher Mullins (2009)
points out that Rwanda was a very patriarchal society, one in which women were often
seen as the property of men (p. 720). Women were often raped in front of their husbands,
fathers, and sons, and in some cases, their fathers or sons were forced to rape them, which
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destroyed the men’s ability to enforce the society’s gender norms of protecting their
women (Mullins, 2009, p. 722).
Moreover, the Rwanda tribunal’s decision regarding rape as genocide
acknowledged that the rapes were not sexual in nature, but a tool of war used to destroy
the Tutsis (Russell-Brown, 2003, p. 352). It is important to note this because although
many of the perpetrators in Rwanda used sexual terms when raping women, their overall
goal was to destroy the Tutsis via sexual violence against the women. Many societal
norms were destroyed during the genocide, and left women with a heavy burden to carry
in the post-genocide society.
Hypersexualization of Tutsi Women
In addition to the physical stereotypes about Tutsis, Tutsi women were subjected
to hypersexualization by the Hutu extremists. Kangura played up the myth that Tutsi
women were far more beautiful than Hutu women, commanding Hutu men not to
befriend or marry a Tutsi woman, nor hire her or keep her as a concubine (Gourevitch,
1998, p. 88). According to Human Rights Watch (1996), Hutu propaganda depicted Tutsi
women as very sexual, willing to sleep with their Tutsi brothers; it also condemned Tutsi
women as arrogant and looking down on Hutu men as ugly and inferior (p. 16). Thus,
rape was used as a way to get revenge on these women for refusing to sleep with Hutu
men. Another way Tutsi women were hypersexualized was when Kangura portrayed
them as seductresses and spies for the RPF. Figure 1 below shows a cartoon from
Kangura demonstrating this.

93

Figure 1. A 1994 cartoon in Kangura that says in Kinyarwanda: "General Dallaire and
his army have fallen into the trap of Tutsi femme fatales." Note. Taken from Sai (2012).
The propaganda successfully rendered Tutsi women as hypersexual, willing to
seduce the Hutu to help the RPF take over the country. RPF and Kangura encouraged the
rape of Tutsi women, describing them as sexually special; many perpetrators told their
victims they wanted to know if Tutsi women were like Hutu women, or how they tasted
(Human Rights Watch, 1996, pp. 18-19). This hypersexualization fueled the mass rape of
women all across Rwanda during the genocide.
Rape as an act of mental harm
Article II of the United Nations Genocide Convention (1948) declares measures
that cause serious bodily and mental harm to members of a group an act of genocide. As
described in the previous paragraph, Tutsi women were hypersexualized, which
facilitated the mass rape of women. The perpetrators subjected the Tutsis women to
severe mental harm during the attacks. Many victims were told they were too proud and
thus deserved to be attacked (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 19). Although the exact
number of rape victims during the genocide is unknown, a survey conducted by
UNAMIR of 304 survivors found that 28% of victims were under age 18; 43.75%
between the ages of 19-26; 17.1% between 27-35; 8.55% between 36-45; and 1.6% over
age 45 (as cited in Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 24). The fact that most of the victims
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were of an age to marry and reproduce is not coincidental, as women were generally
targeted due to their reproductive capabilities.
In addition to being sexually assaulted, around 70 percent of rape survivors are
HIV positive, with a number of the cases being the result of the Hutu extremists
encouraging perpetrators with HIV/AIDS to rape women to deliberately infect them with
the disease (Fox, 2011, pp. 289-290). The knowledge that they would die slowly from a
debilitating disease added to the humiliation the survivors felt. Some victims told Human
Rights Watch (1996) that their attackers said that rather than killing them on the spot,
they would leave them to die from their grief (p. 35). Many women begged to be killed so
their suffering would end; instead, they were spared from death so they could be
humiliated by being repeatedly raped (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 39). Many women
have to live with the knowledge that their families were killed and they were only saved
from death due to being repeatedly raped and even gang-raped.
It is important to note that the mental harm caused by mass rape was not only
inflicted upon the survivors, but also on their communities. As Fox (2011) points out,
many of the women were raped in front of their husbands and sons in order to emasculate
the men (p. 289). The inability of the men to prevent their wives and mothers from being
raped caused mental anguish and humiliation. When Fox (2011) interviewed survivors of
the genocide, she discovered that the men found it very difficult to talk with their
surviving family members about their rape, as they did not know how to approach the
subject (p. 297). More than one male genocide survivor recounted that their attempts to
get a family member to talk about being raped were shut down by the survivor, who was
too ashamed of their experience to discuss it (Fox, 2011, pp. 296-297). The inability of
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rape survivors to talk about what happened to them increased their sense of isolation and
led to a distancing of the survivor from her family. Being incapable of recounting their
trauma to their community has caused the women to still feel humiliated and have
nightmares, with a few telling Human Rights Watch (1996) that they have thought about
committing suicide (p. 45).
Another source of mental anguish for the Tutsi communities is the presence of
rape babies. A social worker told Human Rights Watch (1996) that the children born to
rape survivors are called the children of an Interahamwe (p. 72). According to Human
Rights Watch (1996), although abortion is illegal in Rwanda, many women tried selfinducing abortions or went to private clinics in Rwanda or the Democratic Republic of
Congo if they had the money; the women who self-induced an abortion had to be treated
for uterine infections, uterus rupturing, and hemorrhaging (pp. 77-78). In many cases,
women who did give birth were unable to accept the child because they reminded them of
the trauma inflicted upon them, and some women call their children “unwanted children”,
“children of bad memories”, or “children of hate”, with some women abandoning their
babies if they resembled their attacker too much or allowing their babies to die once they
got home (Human Rights Watch, 1996, pp. 79-81).
The mental harm done to the rape survivors as well as their communities was
vast. Having discussed this aspect in detail, I will now discuss the other part of Article II
of the UN Genocide Convention (1948), rape as an act that caused severe physical harm.
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Rape as an act of physical harm
Many of the women suffered major damage to their bodies, especially their
reproductive organs, when they were subjected to gang rape and/or raped with a foreign
object. Most of the women who were treated for rape after the genocide had vaginal
infections, and some had HIV (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 25). Several of the victims
were told by their attackers that they wanted to know what Tutsi women “tasted like” or
“looked like” (Human Rights Watch, 1996). During the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda’s (ICTR’s) trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, the mayor of Taba, a witness
identified only as JJ told the court that when she had fled to the Bureau Communale of
Taba for safety but was raped, Akayesu told the Interahamwe as they finished raping the
women, “Never ask me again what a Tutsi woman tastes like…Tomorrow they will all be
killed” (Neuffer, 2001, p. 271). As mentioned in a previous section of this chapter, the
hypersexualization of Tutsi women contributed to their mass rape, and this is clearly
demonstrated via the use of the phrases “taste like” and “look like” by the attackers.
JJ was not subjected to rape for the first time in the Bureau Communale; in fact,
she had been raped in a sorghum field and a forest prior to fleeing to Taba for safety
(Neuffer, 2001, p. 271). While at the Bureau Communale, she was raped by three men,
with the third attacker being so vicious during the assault that she could not put her legs
together; she believed she would die from the assaults (Neuffer, 2001, pp. 288-289). As a
leader, Akayesu had a responsibility to protect the people in his area; instead, he allowed
Tutsis to be killed and encouraged mass rape, likening Tutsi women to “…a piece of
melon, waiting to be carved, eaten, and thrown away” (Neuffer, 2001, p. 284). The
testimony of JJ and other survivors helped link rape to genocide, and led to Akayesu and
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others being convicted of rape as genocide for the first time under international law
(Neuffer, 2001, p. 272).
Like JJ, many women were raped by more than one assailant. The rapes met two
acts of genocide listed in the UN Genocide Convention (1948): “Causing serious bodily
or mental harm to members of the group” and “Imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group” (as cited in Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 34). Human Rights
Watch (1996) points out that rape and sexual violence can leave a woman physically
unable to reproduce, or she may be denied the opportunity to do so by the community
because of the assaults (p. 35). In the following paragraphs, I will discuss individual
stories of sexual violence against the Tutsi collected by Human Rights Watch (1996) for
their report to provide detailed information on the physical harm carried out against the
women.
Bernadette was raped at a riverside by a group of six Interahamwe and thrown
into the river to drown. When she did not die, the Interahamwe let her go, but she was
raped by another group of Interahamwe, became pregnant, and miscarried the baby (pp.
42-43). Perpetue was taken to a river by a group of Interahamwe, with one member
saying they knew the best method “to check that Tutsi women were like Hutu women”
(p. 43). For two days, Perpetue was raped by as many as 20 Interahamwe, and on the
third day one let her go when he saw she could not walk anymore. After seeking refuge in
a church, another Interahamwe raped her; later on, two other members sharpened the end
of a hoe and pushed the stick inside her three times until she bled everywhere. They let
her go, but she was raped again by another Interahamwe and black, heavy blood kept
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oozing out of her vagina. Perpetue received medical care in Kibuye, but she has not had
her period since the genocide ended, and her stomach swells up sometimes (pp. 43-45).
Anne was raped by the Interahamwe, and while she was being raped, one of the
men told her that “…they wanted to kill all Tutsi so that in the future all that would be
left would be drawings to show that there were once a people called the Tutsi” (p. 52).
Marie was kidnapped by the Interahamwe and marched to a neighboring commune, being
threatened with rape along the journey. The Interahamwe came at night with torches to
pick which women to rape; Marie was raped by three men and began urinating blood, but
did receive medical treatment after the genocide (pp. 53-54). Constance was raped by
four young men, some of whom were as young as 12; after they finished raping her, the
Interahamwe told her to go because she probably had AIDS (pp. 55-56).
Mullins (2009) recounts that in addition to being raped, many victims were
paraded around in public naked, something that is seen as very shameful in Rwanda,
especially if the woman is a mother (p. 729). A female student at a secondary school was
forced to stand naked and do gymnastics in front of a crowd of Interahamwe before
Akayesu told the Interahamwe to be sure to have sex with the girl (p. 729). Mullins
(2009) also describes the attackers as telling their victims that they hated the Tutsi and
were going to take free advantage of them, since the women could no longer reject them
(p. 729). This translated into mass rape of the women, with one victim having a tree
branch thrust into her vagina, another one being raped with a policeman’s truncheon, a
third having a cigarette put out in her vagina, and a fourth being pierced with a spear in
her sexual organs and having a breast cut off (Mullins, 2009, pp. 729-730).
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In one of the interviews conducted by Totten and Ubaldo (2011) with Tutsi
survivors about their experiences, one participant, Rose, recounted how the Interahamwe
came into a compound where Tutsis were hiding and would grab the breasts of the
women “…if they were still firm, not like older women, and if they [their breasts] were
firm they would take them to rape them” (p. 29). Rose reunited with her children and was
running toward the nearest roadblock when four of the Interahamwe raped her in front of
her children (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 31).
One of the most extreme examples of sexual dehumanization in Rwanda is found
in Denise’s story: six militia men, including a neighbor she knew, came into her house
looking for her husband. When she refused to tell them where he was, she was beaten and
raped by one of the militias. After he had finished, he took her inside the house and held
one of her legs open while another militia held the other one open. The first militia called
the others inside to see what the inside of a Tutsi woman looked like; he then proceeded
to cut out the inside of her vagina, put it on a small stick, and put the stick in the ground
outside her house so “Everyone who comes past here will see how the Tutsikazi
[Kinyarwanda word for Tutsi] look” (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 63). Denise was
treated with traditional medicine by a Hutu neighbor but did not see a doctor, and has
extreme pain during her menstrual period (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 64).
Survivors like Denise were severely harmed by the mass rape and rape with
foreign objects, which caused damage, sometimes permanently, to their reproductive
organs. This left the survivors incapable of giving birth, thus eliminating the possibility
of future births among the Tutsi population. Many survivors also do not publicly disclose
that they were raped, as they can be ostracized by their families and their communities.
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Human Rights Watch (1996) states that many Rwandans assume that rape victims have
an STD, most often AIDS, which leads rape victims to fear that they will never get
married if they admit they were raped (p. 72). In Rwandan society, women are valued for
their roles as wives and mothers, which makes the issue of marriageability very
important.
In addition to women being valued for their suitability for marriage, marriage is
the best option for many of the women to have economic stability and security, as well as
protection (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 72). Many of the rape victims who lost family
and do not, or cannot, marry, are unable to even farm their family’s lands, as they need
help to work the fields (p. 72). This has left many survivors trapped in poverty, with little
hope for improvement. Moreover, several survivors did not seek medical care as they
were afraid of being judged by their communities and society as a whole, and even
though some women did seek medical treatment, they did not disclose to their doctors
that they were raped, forcing the doctors to circumvent the issue and ask other questions
in order to find out what happened and properly treat the women (Human Rights Watch,
1996, pp. 72-73).
Chapter Conclusion
In this chapter, I explored both physical and sexual dehumanization in Rwanda in
great detail. It was necessary to start off with a brief history of the genocide in order to
provide the reader with a context. Next, I described how physical dehumanization was
used in Rwanda, including the dehumanizing language used as well as its persuasiveness
for the perpetrators of the genocide. I then briefly discussed rape as an act of genocide,
and then delved into sexual dehumanization in Rwanda, including the hypersexualization
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of Tutsi women as well as rape as an act of mental harm and rape as an act of physical
harm.
Both physical and sexual dehumanization were used quite successfully in Rwanda
in order to facilitate the killings of the Tutsis as well as the mass rape and sexual torture
inflicted upon the Tutsi women. The sexual abuse in the genocide has had a lasting
impact on the survivors, both in terms of physical issues and psychological ones. We may
never know all the costs incurred from the genocide, but it is safe to assume that they
were very high. Having explained physical and sexual dehumanization in great detail in
this chapter, it is now time to turn my attention to the second case study: the ongoing
genocide in Darfur, Sudan.
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Chapter 5: Case Study Darfur
Chapter Introduction
Since 2004, a civil war and genocide has occurred in Darfur, the western region of
Sudan. This chapter will follow the outline of chapter 4, in that I will examine both
physical and sexual dehumanization that is occurring in Darfur. First, I will start the
chapter off with a brief overview of the history of genocide, in order to provide the reader
with a background. Next, I will look at the various types of physical dehumanization used
in Darfur and how structural violence facilitated the dehumanization. After that, I will
explore sexual dehumanization, including the mass rape and impregnation of women.
Lastly, I will conclude the chapter with a summary of the previous sections and final
thoughts on dehumanization in general in Darfur.
Brief History of Genocide in Darfur
As mentioned above, a civil war and genocide are ongoing in Darfur. Over
400,000 people have been killed, with millions of Darfuris being internally displaced and
several hundred thousand living as refugees in Chad and other neighboring countries
(Marlowe et. al., 2006, pp. 3-4). Prior to the genocide, the so-called African tribes
(consisting mainly of the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit) and “Arab” (lighter skinned groups
within Darfur) generally got along; the Africans were farmers, while the Arabs were
herders, and the Africans would allow the Arabs to water and graze their livestock on
their lands (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 7). This arrangement fell apart with the increasing
desertification of the arable land in Darfur: farmers began enclosing their lands and
denying the herders any use of their water and crops (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 7). A war
between the Arabs and the Fur took place between 1987-1989, and just after the peace
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agreement between the two sides was reached, the National Islamic Front (NIF) took
power in a coup and installed General Omar al Bashir as Sudan’s leader (Flint & de
Waal, 2005, p. 25).
The new government favored the Arab groups over the African ones, which
angered the African tribes. This favoritism, combined with systemic racism and neglect,
led to the formation of two rebel groups: the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). In February 2003, the SLA and JEM rebels
destroyed government planes in the regional capital of El Fasher, catching the
government off guard; they subsequently carried out other attacks on police stations,
army barracks, and convoys throughout Darfur (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p.76).
Rather than negotiate with the rebel groups, the government responded by arming
local militias that became known as the Janjaweed, or “devils on horseback” who then
attacked villages (Steidle, 2007, p. 36). The Janjaweed travel on horses and camels and
attack villages at dawn; they shoot anyone they come across, steal livestock and
possessions, cut down fruit trees and destroy crops, rape women and girls, and burn down
the village (Steidle, 2007, p. 36). The complete destruction of the village and all its
supplies is deliberately done to drive the African groups off the land and to prevent them
from coming back to rebuild, so the Arab groups can use the land for their own purposes
(Steidle, 2007, pp. 36-37).
Although an African Union (AU) force is operating in Darfur, the soldiers’ roles
are largely limited to collecting information on attacks on villages and submitting reports
to the AU and United Nations; the AU is also forced to work with the Sudanese army in
many cases to even access attack sites (Steidle, 2007, pp. 73-75). Over 400,000 people
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have died; roughly half of those deaths came from the original attacks on the villages, but
now most Darfuris are dying from disease and starvation (Steidle, 2007). Although a
peace agreement was signed between the government and some of the rebel groups in
2005, millions of people are still displaced and both the war and genocide are ongoing
with no end in sight. In fact, in a recent Bloomberg article, El Wardany (2016) wrote that
73,000 Darfuris have fled their homes in the past month due to fighting between the
government and the rebel groups.
Physical Dehumanization in Darfur
Systemic Racism and Structural Violence in Sudan
The word Darfur means “Land of the Fur”, one of the major ethnic groups in the
region (de Waal, 2005, p. 181). Although North Sudan is seen as Arab and South Sudan
as African, the people of Darfur use multiple identities and saw their land as
encompassing both Arabs and Africans (de Waal, 2005, pp. 185-187). Both Arab and
African groups have intermarried in Darfur, which can make it difficult to distinguish
between the two groups. I was at a conference in Washington, D.C. in 2005 on the war in
Darfur, and two men were speaking on a panel about race in Darfur. They announced to
the audience that in Sudan, one man is defined as Arab, while the other is labeled an
African; they then asked if anyone in the audience knew which man was which. We
could not tell just by looking at them, which is fairly common in Darfur. However, the
government of Sudan has decided that those with lighter skin are Arab, while those with
black skin are African (Sharkey, 2008, p. 27). Some Arabs even refer to Darfuris as zurq,
or “blue [dark-skinned] people” (Sharkey, 2008, p. 27).
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After determining ethnicity based on skin color, the succeeding Arab
governments in Khartoum created and sustained a system of racial and religious
discrimination against the rest of the Sudanese. The government made Arabic the official
language, which was met with resistance in South Sudan by the rebel leaders, who
wanted Arabic-English bilingualism officially recognized by the government in education
and governmental matters (Sharkey, 2008, p. 25). However, if a Sudanese wanted to
attend school beyond the small village schools, they were forced to learn Arabic. Halima
Bashir (2008), a doctor from Darfur, recounts in her autobiography that when she was
speaking Zaghawa with a classmate during lunch when she first started school, the
headmistress cracked both girls on the head with a stick and told them they could only
speak Arabic at her school (p. 70). Bashir (2008) would also be hit for stepping out of
line, and was beaten severely by a teacher when she only cleaned one side of a
blackboard because the other girl, who was Arab, had not shown up to clean the other
side (p. 76). Most Darfuris, however, cannot afford to attend school beyond the primary
level.
In addition to unequal access to education, the government of Sudan has spent the
revenue from the oil refineries on projects in and around Khartoum, the capital. The
government has built skyscrapers and hotels there, and the people in Khartoum are
largely middle class or rich, which has led to the building of shopping malls, coffee
houses, apartment blocks, and a large increase in the number of cars in the capital
(Cockett, 2010, pp. 8-9). This confluence of wealth in the north means that Bashir and the
NIF have the support of the people there, which keeps them in power. In addition, many
of the people in Khartoum are unaware of the genocide in Darfur, and most do not want
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to know what is happening: Cockett (2010) interviewed a Sudanese economist who,
when told about the violence in Darfur, replied that the reports must be exaggerated and
that the people in the refugee camps were “…enjoying the free food, watching television,
chatting on their cell phones…relaxing and enjoying themselves, with nice clothes” (p.
36). Sadly, this is not an uncommon view in the capital.
The lack of government spending in Darfur is a clear example of structural
violence. As mentioned in chapter 2, during British colonial rule, Darfur had ninety
elementary schools, eleven intermediate schools, and one secondary school (Daly, 2007,
p. 134). Railroads only reached Darfur after independence, the roads were simply tracks
made by trucks that became impassable during the rainy season, and both drought and
famine plagued the region (Daly, 2007, pp. 138-139). Things did not improve after
independence: clean water was almost completely inaccessible, with the people in ElFasher, the region’s capital, getting sick from drinking water contaminated by sewage
(Prunier, 2008, p. 50). When famine occurred in the early 1980s, the government
dismissed reports as “exaggerated;” when they finally began distributing food aid, most
of the food did not reach rural areas due to transportation problems, and the government
provided significantly less aid than was needed (Prunier, 2008, p. 51; Daly, 2007, p. 232).
In general, the government saw Darfur as a region that provided no useful natural
resources but one that would ally with the government due to most of the population of
Darfur being Muslims. According to de Waal (2005), the NIF saw Darfur as a major
constituency of devout Muslims who could be mobilized for their purposes (p. 191).
Bashir (2008) recalls that government agents went to Zaghawa villages to recruit young
men to fight for the government in the civil war in the south; they would tell the men that
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they would be fighting in a jihad, and that it was their duty to kill the non-believers in the
south (pp. 126-127). The political parties would also campaign in Darfur but when they
would win the votes of the people, they failed to deliver on any promises and instead
gave positions of power and privilege to the Arab groups (Jok, 2007, p.64). This clear
favoritism of the Arab groups over the African groups angered the Africans, and
contributed to the civil war and subsequent genocide.
To reiterate, the government of Sudan encouraged the young men in Darfur to
fight for them in the civil war in the south, but it also discriminated against Darfuris.
Bashir (2008) describes an incident in a marketplace where a black man and an Arab man
got into a heated argument, with the Arab calling the black man a dog and a slave; when
the black man began to beat up the Arab man, six Arab policemen intervened, savagely
beat the black man, and dragged him away in their car without even asking who had
started the fight or attempting to punish the Arab man as well (pp. 124-125). Bashir
(2008) also recounted her anger at discovering that one of her teachers, an Arab, lived in
a nice home with running water and electricity, a home that was reserved for Arabs only
(p.99). As Bashir (2008) mentally compared this modern house with her uncle’s mud and
brick house, and the poverty of her village, she became enraged and threw a stone at one
of the houses and broke a window (p. 100).
The government’s neglect of Darfur’s needs, combined with its systemic racism
against the Africans and clear favoritism of the Arabs, contributed to the civil war that
began in 2003. Both the SLM and JEM claim that they are representing the people in
Darfur in their demands for equal treatment from the government. Flint and de Waal
(2005) describe members of the SLM as devout Muslims who pray five times a day and
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helped the villagers by fetching water, offering whatever meat they had, and walking for
hours to the villages to get information about government attacks (pp. 66-67). Both rebel
groups view the situation as one of self-defense: the government wants to ethnically
cleanse them from the land so they can give it to the Arabs; therefore, they must fight
back (Flint and de Waal, 2005, p. 71).
Marlowe et al. (2006) interviewed a man named Suleiman, who told them that
the people of Darfur do not want to secede from Sudan, as there are not enough natural
resources to make Darfur a sustainable independent country (p. 113). Suleiman also told
Marlowe et al. (2006) that the true enemy of the people is not the Arabs, but the
government; this is the case because if the fight was just between the Arabs and Africans,
either the Africans would defeat them, or there would be a negotiated settlement. The
government is using the Arabs to force the Africans off their lands and take it over (p.
109). The Darfuris want equal treatment by the government, as well as funds to improve
the infrastructure such as roads, schools, and hospitals. Darfur was neglected for so long
that its people reached the point where they believed that a rebellion was the only way to
get the government to pay attention to their needs.
Unfortunately, instead of responding to the rebels in a positive way such as
negotiating with them, the government began a campaign of genocide against not just the
rebels, but anyone from the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit ethnic groups. As mentioned
previously, the government armed Arabs who became known as the Janjaweed, or
“Devils on Horseback.” As Marlowe, et al. (2006) pointed out, Omar al Bashir and the
NIF are largely unpopular with most the Sudanese population, because only a small
group of elite Sudanese in and around Khartoum benefit from the oil revenues and
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government spending (pp. 68-69). The NIF knows that if it negotiates with the Darfuri
rebels and diverts money away from the capital, it will lose the support of the elite and
might be toppled in an uprising. Therefore, Bashir’s response to any threat to his regime
is to eliminate it.
As mentioned previously, the NIF government has actively discriminated against
the African groups in Darfur. Common dehumanizing terms used in Darfur include black
dog, monkey, and Abeed, or “slave” (Bashir, 2008, p. 124). Abeed has also been used in
South Sudan, when the government forces would kidnap women and children and sell
them into slavery in the north. According to de Waal (2005), Abeed is used by some Arab
supremacists in Darfur about the African groups, as a reminder of their so-called “Arab
superiority” (p. 199). Jok (2007) points out that members of the Janjaweed use the word
Abeed during their attacks to distance themselves from their victims, to keep from feeling
any remorse for their actions (p. 127). Seeing Darfuris as inferior and animal like has
made it easier for the government to carry out attacks not only against the rebel groups,
but also the civilians.
Attacks on Civilians in Darfur
It is important to reiterate that Omar al-Bashir’s government responds to any
threats by attempting to eliminate the individual or group responsible for this threat. To
that end, since 2003, the government has armed and supported the Janjaweed attacks in
Darfur. A typical attack on a village in Darfur goes like this: first, the government
helicopters will circle the village, firing on civilians and dropping bombs. Next, the
Janjaweed enter the village before dawn, killing men, raping women, and abducting or
killing children; then the militias burn down the homes and all the village’s infrastructure,
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destroy crops, steal livestock, cut down fruit trees, and destroy all sources of food and
water (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 64). The Janjaweed recruits are paid 150,000 Sudanese
pounds [roughly $24,000] per month, plus 20,000 Sudanese pounds a day for a horse or
camel; they can keep all the loot they can carry, except for cash and heavy weapons (Flint
& de Waal, 2005, p. 40). This monetary incentive, combined with racism and systemic
dehumanization, makes recruitment easy for the government.
Attacks on the civilians can be especially cruel, as Steidle (2007) saw firsthand:
Several bloody corpses filled a shallow grave. They were lined up in a row and
covered with grass mats. Images from the Holocaust and Rwanda filled my
mind…Every single man in this countless row of African civilians had had his
eyes plucked out and his ears cut off…Another photo revealed a man lying in the
dirt, blood streaming away from his groin. He had been castrated and left to bleed
to death (p. 88).
In another attack Steidle (2007) investigated, a witness told him that the Janjaweed had
locked thirty-four people in their huts and burned them alive (p. 140). In the village of
Hamada, 107 of the 450 villagers had been tortured and murdered; infants had been
crushed, toddlers had their faces smashed in with rifle butts, and a message was left on a
blackboard in the school, calling the civilians “Faggots” and “Donkeys” (Steidle, 2007, p.
214).
Although there has been some debate over whether or not what is happening in
Darfur constitutes genocide, it is my belief that the government’s actions meet the UN
(1948) definition of genocide. Steidle (2007) was given a document that outlined the
government’s plan of action in Darfur; the document contains phrases like “Change the
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demography in Darfur”, and orders of “Killings, burning of villages, farms and terrorize
and rob properties from African tribes and force them to migrate outside of Darfur…” (p.
187). The International Criminal Court (ICC) (2008), based on a number of evidence, has
indicted Omar al-Bashir on several counts, including genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes (p. 3). The International Criminal Court’s (2008) indictment continually
refers to “Forces and agents controlled by Al Bashir” (p. 5) when detailing the alleged
crimes being committed in Darfur.
At the very least, if this is not indicative of genocide, it does show a government
plan to ethnically cleanse Darfur of the African groups. Flint and de Waal (2005)
describe a communique between a Sudanese army commander and a pilot wherein the
commander tells the pilot there are people in an attacked village who say they will work
with the government; the pilot’s response is to say not to trust any of the villagers and to
kill them all (p. 107). Moreover, Flint and de Waal (2005) discuss an attack on a village
where 66 villagers were hanged by their feet or decapitated, and schoolgirls were chained
together and burnt alive; in a particularly vicious attack, the Janjaweed stopped a woman
with a 21-day old baby boy named Ahmed at a roadblock and cut off Ahmed’s penis;
Ahmed died shortly after the attack (pp. 108-109).
The deliberate destruction of the villages and forced migration of the people
clearly demonstrate how systemic racism and physical dehumanization made genocide
possible in Darfur. Civilians are supposed to be protected during a war, but the Sudanese
government is instead deliberately targeting them for extermination. Those who are not
killed in the initial attack on a village are left to die from disease and famine. Those who
are lucky enough to cross into neighboring Chad have received aid from the international
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community, but the aid has dried up as the war and genocide continue. The government’s
plan to rid all of Darfur of the African groups has been largely successful. Having
described physical dehumanization in detail, I will now turn my attention to the sexual
dehumanization of women in Darfur.
Sexual Dehumanization
Like the first case study of Rwanda, the women in Darfur have been subjected to
mass rape and sexual violence. Additionally, the rape in Darfur meets two of the criteria
for genocide under the UN Genocide Convention (1948): “Causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group” and “Imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group.” I will explain both criteria in detail in the following sections.
Rape as Physical Harm
The mass rape in Darfur has caused severe physical harm to the women and girls.
One issue that increases the physical damage is the fact that most of the women in Darfur
have undergone female circumcision. The type of female circumcision that is practiced in
Darfur is known as infibulation. According to the World Health Organization (2016),
infibulation is when the external genital organs are removed and the flesh is sewn
together, leaving a small opening for urine and menstrual blood. Infibulation is the worst
type of circumcision, and the results can include: girls dying during the procedure from
blood loss and shock, death from a resulting infection due to unsterilized tools being
used, and complications while giving birth (World Health Organization, 2016). As the
World Health Organization (2016) points out, there are no medical or health benefits to
the procedure, and it is often done in order to ensure that a girl remains “pure” before
marriage, by taking away her ability to feel sexual desire.

113
The near universal practice of female circumcision in Darfur has made treating
rape victims harder. With infibulation, the vaginal opening is widened on the girl’s
wedding night via penile penetration, or it can be widened with a knife (World Health
Organization, 2016). The opening is very painful, and rape makes the pain more severe.
Bashir (2008) recounts an incident in her autobiography when the Janjaweed attacked a
primary school and raped the girls and women, with many of the girls being under the
age of 10 (pp. 209-212). While treating a girl named Aisha, Bashir (2008) noticed that the
girl had been ripped apart by the first attacker, leaving a red, bloodied rawness of flesh
(p. 213). Bashir (2008) had to try to help many other girls who had the same injuries by
sewing their wounds, binding their legs with rope, and giving them half a sleeping tablet
so they would rest (pp. 213-216).
Evelyn Aswad (1996) argues that rape can be considered an act of torture if
perpetrated by government officials or government backed groups and if done for
political purposes (p. 1915). I believe that the rapes in Darfur constitute torture, as the
Janjaweed’s deliberate attack of young girls is designed to inflict maximum physical pain
on the African groups in Darfur. Aswad (1996) also rightly points out that viewing rape
as different from torture “…perpetuates the myth that rape is a private, sexual act rather
than a political weapon and reinforces notions that a woman’s dignity…is less worthy of
protection than a man’s” (p. 1916). Women in the IDP or refugee camps are usually sent
to get firewood and water for their families, because they will “only” be raped. Women
who try to work in their fields may be attacked by militias or government forces, and it is
especially dangerous during the dry season for women to collect water: the river beds are
dry, so women have to dig holes into the river bed and collect the water as it slowly
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comes out, which means they may be by the river bed for hours, trying to collect enough
water (Haroun, 2007). This leaves the woman more vulnerable to rape, but if the men or
boys are sent to collect water or firewood, they are killed by the Janjaweed, so rape is
seen as the lesser of two evils in this case. Too often, rape is not recognized as an act of
genocide. The murder of men and young boys is clearly labeled genocide, but rape has
been dismissed as a secondary issue. It is important to acknowledge that rape is an act of
genocide, and that women and girls who experience rape should receive the same support
and care as other genocide survivors.
Rape as Mental Harm
The rape of women and young girls is not only an act of physical harm, but it is
also an act of mental harm. Bashir (2008) describes a Zaghawa man who did not know
how to help his daughter after she had been raped; in Darfur, men are supposed to protect
their wives and children, but this man had been unable to do so (p. 212). Bashir (2008)
helped the man pull himself together enough to comfort his daughter as she treated the
child, but treating all the girls had a heavy emotional toll on her (pp. 212-213). Bashir
(2008) also talked to one of the teachers who had been raped; the woman would not
admit what happened because she did not want her husband to know, and she was feeling
guilty because she did not fight off her attackers or die trying to do so, as the Masalit and
Zaghawa believe it is better for a woman to die resisting rather than suffer rape (pp. 215216).
Bashir (2008) herself was raped by the government forces. After the attack on the
school, Bashir spoke to UN soldiers about what happened, on the condition that they did
not use her name (p. 220). However, three soldiers came to the village clinic, grabbed
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her, and took her to a military camp, where she was severely beaten and then left tied up
in a hut (pp. 223-225). The next day, three different soldiers came into the hut and gang
raped her while also burning her with cigarettes and cutting her with a knife (pp. 226227). During the rapes, Bashir (2008) was repeatedly called a black dog and told prior to
the initial assault to “Lie back and take it like the black slave you are” (p. 226). Bashir
was also raped by two of the soldiers who brought her in originally, and the third one told
her they were going to release her, because he knew she would prefer to die (pp. 227228). The soldier also told Bashir that she would have to live with what happened for the
rest of her life (p. 228).
In the case of Bashir (2008), she was gang raped as punishment for speaking out
about the rape, and she was attacked to cause her severe physical and mental harm.
Bashir states in her autobiography that she felt guilty for what happened, that she should
have fought the men off or died trying (p. 230). This guilt is not uncommon among the
rape survivors, and adds an emotional burden to the physical one they are already
carrying. The Janjaweed also humiliate women by raping girls in town squares, in front
of the villagers; in one case, a 17-year-old girl who resisted being raped was killed and
left naked on the street for the whole village to see (Wagner, 2005-2006, p. 205). In
addition, Wagner (2005-2006) reports that the Janjaweed will break the limbs of victims
to keep them from escaping, as well as marking or branding them: refugee women have
gunshot wounds to the ankle, gashes on their faces, and brands on their backs and arms
(p. 207). This torture serves as a permanent reminder of their attack, which causes severe
mental anguish for the victims.
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In addition to branding or marking the women, the Janjaweed and government
forces will often force a victim’s husband, father, brother, or son witness the rapes before
killing the men (Miller, 2009, p. 506). Miller (2009) makes an excellent point when she
states that, “Morally injurious actions deny the equal moral worth of
victims…Diminishment occurs when the victim is the recipient of behavior that
represents her as not having equal moral standing to the perpetrator (p. 510). The mass
rape of women, combined with the branding and racial slurs used during the attacks,
serve to reinforce the belief that the Arabs are superior to the Africans. Moreover, Miller
argues that rapes “…compromise victims’ equal moral standing, and, by extension, the
equal moral standing of their families and communities. In short, genocidal rape can
obliterate the dignity of the group as a whole” (p. 512). By forcing men to watch the
rapes, the Janjaweed and government forces are mocking them for being unable to carry
out their cultural duty of protecting the women in their families and communities. This
causes mental harm to the members of the group, and can make it harder for a rape victim
to receive support from their community, as the feelings of shame and helplessness may
block any discussions of the attacks. Miller (2009) states that Darfuri women and girls
suffer additional hardships, both physical and mental, when they face alienation and
banishment from their families and communities (p. 514). The deliberate attacks on
women and girls are done to destroy their communities and the unity felt between
members of the group.
Rape as a measure intended to prevent births
As mentioned previously, the UN Genocide Convention (1948) lists “Imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group” as an act of genocide. This has
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manifested in several ways in Darfur. First, the deliberate killing of men and boys within
the targeted groups. This is straightforward; the story in an above section about 21-dayold Ahmed being castrated by the Janjaweed (Flint & de Waal, 2005, pp. 108-109).
shows their determination to keep the population from reproducing. Even if Ahmed had
lived, he would have been unable to father children, and thus would be unlikely to get
married. Second, the Janjaweed and government forces have disemboweled pregnant
women and killed babies. Marlowe et al. (2006) were told by an interviewee that he saw a
pregnant woman murdered by the Janjaweed, who then cut open her womb (p. 122).
Askin (2006) describes attacks on children by the Janjaweed: the attackers cut out the
stomachs of pregnant women, with male fetuses being hit against a tree and female ones
dropped into the dirt; another attack involved a baby being removed from a woman’s
back and sliced through the stomach; one woman’s baby girl was smashed against a tree
and killed; and finally, government soldiers captured 16 women with babies, broke the
baby boys’ necks, and beat the mothers with their own babies like a whip until the babies
died (p. 146). Askin (2006) recounts instances of sexual torture of women, including
three girls having nails put in their vaginas, two having their vaginas sewn up, and others
being gang raped, both vaginally and anally, or raped with foreign objects, as well as
having their breasts and vaginas mutilated (pp. 146-148).
While the deliberate killing of men and babies are acts done to prevent births, the
biggest act being undertaken by the Janjaweed and government soldiers is the mass rape
and intentional impregnation of Darfuri women. Askin (2006) included testimony from
survivors in her chapter, such as women being told they would be the wives of the militia
members, and statements like “We rape you to make a free baby, not a slave like you”
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and “We will take your women and make them ours. We will change the race” (p. 147).
Amnesty International (2004) investigated on the atrocities in Darfur and interviewed 250
women who had been raped (Section 1.1). One victim told Amnesty International (2004)
that the Janjaweed would sing while raping women and tell them that they are slaves, and
that the militia can do whatever they want with them (Section 3.1). Women who attempt
to flee their villages have been raped at roadblocks or checkpoints by the Janjaweed, as
well as being raped while collecting water and firewood at IDP or refugee camps
(Amnesty International, 2004, Section 3.3.). Amnesty International (2004) was told by
Darfuris that while the community might accept a raped woman back into the
community, the child they would bear from being raped would not be welcomed, as they
are seen as a child of the enemy (Section 4.1).
Like Amnesty International (2004), Médecins Sans Frontiéres [Doctors Without
Borders; hereafter abbreviated as MSF] (2005) has also conducted investigations into the
violence in Darfur, and doctors from MSF has treated hundreds of rape victims (p. 2).
Between October 2004-February 2005, MSF (2005) treated 297 rape victims between the
ages of 12 and 45; most of the victims were raped while doing every day, ordinary
activities (p. 3). 28% of women were raped by two or more men, and many women were
held captive and repeatedly raped (Médecins Sans Frontiéres, 2005, p. 4). Women were
also treated for injuries resulting from rape and sexually transmitted diseases, such as
AIDS (Médecins Sans Frontiéres, 2005, p. 5). At the time they sought treatment from
MSF (2005), 7% of women knew they were already pregnant from the rape, although
with many others, it was too soon to tell (p. 5).
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Women who do become pregnant from the rapes face ostracism from their
families and communities, and can even be arrested by the government. MSF (2005)
states that some women who report their rape to the police are arrested for an illegal
pregnancy if they are not married; the police will lock the women up and beat them, as
well as fining them (p. 6). Askin (2006) confirms this, explaining that survivors are
charged with zena, which is adultery or having sex outside of marriage, if they cannot
prove that they were raped (p. 149). The government does not even attempt to investigate
claims of rape, which results in most victims refusing to report their attack (Wagner,
2005-2006, p. 209).
MSF (2005) interviewed a 16-year-old woman who had been raped and became
pregnant; when she told her family what had happened, they threw her out of the house,
and her fiancé broke off their engagement, stating that he did not want to marry her
because she was “…disgraced and spoilt” (p. 6). Amnesty International (2004) reported
that a prevailing cultural belief in Darfur is that a nobody can get pregnant when raped,
because it is unwanted sex, therefore, the woman is seen as having consented (Section
4.1). In addition, married women are abandoned by their husbands, which makes them
socially and economically vulnerable (Amnesty International, 2004, Section 4.1).
Amnesty International (2004) argues that women are targeted for violence because of
their ethnicity, and that the militias are deliberately impregnating women from these
ethnic groups (Section 7). Wagner (2005-2006) recounts the testimony of a survivor who
said that after being attacked in a school by the Janjaweed, she was told that “…they
would take care of all of us black people and clean Darfur for good” (p. 201).
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As mentioned above, many rape victims are ostracized by their communities, and
several are thrown out of their homes by their families. This makes women more
vulnerable to repeated assaults, as they have no protection. Amnesty International (2004)
reported that the Janjaweed often show up in the IDP camps, where they rape and kill the
inhabitants (Section 1.2). A Human Rights Watch (2005) report documents the instances
of women being raped in refugee camps in Chad, not only by soldiers, but by Chadian
male civilians as well, when women go out in search of firewood and water (p. 7). One
woman who was raped by a civilian was then abandoned by her husband when they were
reunited in Chad and he discovered she’d become pregnant from the rape (pp. 7-8).
Human Rights Watch (2005) interviewed Sudanese women who had crossed into Chad,
and they described being abused by the Chadian authorities: they are imprisoned by the
authorities for trying to collect firewood outside the camps, and are then raped by
Chadian inmates while in detention (p. 8).
Human Rights Watch (2005) documented the abuses women face in IDP camps
and refugee camps in Chad when they are abandoned by their families. One sixteen-yearold Fur woman was raped by three men while gathering firewood near an IDP camp;
when her family found out, she was thrown out of her home, her fiancé broke off their
engagement because she was “disgraced”, and she was raped by the local police who
came to her dwelling at night (p. 9). Women and girls who are on their own are also
coerced by male residents of the camps and soldiers to provide sexual services in return
for protection (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 9). Another problem is early marriages:
Amnesty International (2004) was told by some refugees that the bride price in the camps
has greatly decreased, and parents are marrying their daughters off at very young ages,
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because they fear that they cannot “control” them in the refugee camps and want to
protect their “honor” (Section 4.5.1). Moreover, women who are the heads of households
are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, and many are forced into prostitution, or are
forced to prostitute their daughters, in order to get essentials such as food, soap, water,
etc. (Amnesty International, 2004, Section 4.5.2).
The rape of women can be seen as a measure intended to prevent births through a
different lens, that of women being labeled “unmarriageable.” As one Fur woman told
Human Rights Watch (2005), “No one would accept to marry a raped woman” (p. 10).
Even victims who cannot become pregnant from the rapes, such as young girls, are
sometimes abandoned by their families because they have “…disgraced their family”
(Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 10). However, some women have received support from
their families. For example, when Bashir’s (2008) father found out she had been raped,
he did not blame her for what happened; he blamed the militias and refused to allow her
to isolate herself from the family (p. 230). Moreover, her father actually arranged for her
to marry a cousin who was living in England; when Bashir (2008) told her husband about
the rapes, he was angry-but not at her-and he did not abandon her or hold her responsible
for what happened (pp. 284-285). However, it should be noted that Bashir’s father and
husband were both University educated men, so they had more knowledge than most men
in Darfur, as well as a wider perspective.
When girls and young women are declared “spoiled” or “disgraced” by their
families, this can prevent them from getting married, which in turns prevents them from
reproducing and adding members to their ethnic group. The Janjaweed and government
soldiers are familiar with Darfuri cultural beliefs, so they know that this will often be the
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result of their attacks on girls and women (Amnesty International, 2004, Section 7). If
they cannot, or do not, make one of the girls from a targeted group pregnant, they will
settle for them being unable to marry. Honor is important to the Fur, Zaghawa, and
Masalit, and a woman being raped is seen as a loss of honor for the family and the
community. The cultural belief that pregnancy can only result from consensual sex
(Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 10) makes it very difficult for a victim to receive any
support or help for being raped. As Médecins Sans Frontiéres (2004) points out, they can
provide emergency contraception and HIV antiretroviral drugs to try and prevent
infection, but these must be taken within 72 hours of the attack (p. 8). Many women are
unable to seek medical assistance that soon after an attack, or are afraid to report it out of
shame or fear they will be disowned by their families, so these victims do not get the
medical attention they desperately need. If a girl or woman is disowned, and forced to
live apart from her family, she is extremely vulnerable to further sexual violence, and she
will suffer economic consequences as well. The Janjaweed and government soldiers take
advantage of the cultural beliefs of the targeted groups to prevent the population from
reproducing, whether it is done via impregnating a woman with a so-called “Arab” baby,
or having the women be declared “unmarriageable” and thus preventing their ability to
reproduce via marriage within the group.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I described the physical and sexual dehumanization that is
occurring in Darfur. The African groups are seen as inferior to the Arab groups, who
insult their victims by calling them “donkeys”, “black dogs”, “faggots”, “black
monkeys”, and “slaves.” The Janjaweed and Sudanese government are attempting to
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cleanse Darfur of the African groups by killing the men and boys, as well as
disemboweling pregnant women. They are also trying to change the ethnicity of the land
by deliberately impregnating women with an Arab baby. As Askin (2006) pointed out,
during and after the attacks, the victims are taunted with comments such as “We will kill
all men and rape women. We want to change the color. Every woman will deliver red.
Arabs are the husbands of these women” and “We will take your women and make them
ours. We will change the race” (p. 147). Statements like these prove that the
government’s plan is to rid Darfur of the African groups, one way or another.
Like Rwanda, women in Darfur have been subjected to mass rape. Unlike
Rwanda, the attacks are done with the goal of impregnating women with a baby from a
different ethnic group, and thus preventing births within the targeted ethnic groups.
Having described physical and sexual dehumanization in Rwanda and Darfur in great
detail, in the next chapter, the conclusion, I will wrap up this dissertation with a summary
of these two cases, describe efforts to rehumanize not only the victims, but also the
perpetrators, and outline possible conflict resolution methods that can be used to create a
lasting peace in both countries.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Chapter Introduction
Throughout this dissertation, I have analyzed dehumanization in genocide,
specifically looking at physical and sexual dehumanization in the Rwandan and Darfur
genocides. In both cases, the targeted groups were subjected to severe acts of physical
and mental harm, acts that were facilitated by the widespread, top-down dehumanizing
language used to call for their extermination. In Rwanda and Darfur, the ethnic groups
that were targeted had been neglected by the government; when they fought back against
this discrimination, their respective governments decided that rather than negotiate with
the groups, or share resources, they would massacre them instead. This decision led to the
deaths of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children, as well as the
displacement of millions. Moreover, my discussion of sexual dehumanization is my
original contribution to the field. There is no formal definition of the term, so I created
my own. I hope this definition will be used in other research in this important area of
genocide studies. In this final chapter, I will sum up both case studies, discuss the
strengths and limitations of the dissertation, and make recommendations for future
research and policies on dehumanization.
Summary of Both Case Studies
Before I go into a detailed summary of both cases, I decided to create a table
comparing the two cases, which is on the next page.
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Table 1
Summary of Case Studies
Case

Date of

Number of

Physical

Genocide

People Killed

Dehumanization Dehumanization
Terms Used

Sexual

as Act of
Genocide

Rwanda

April-July

800,000

1994

Cockroach,

Causing serious

Weed, Hyena,

bodily or mental

“Cut the tall

harm to the group

trees,” Snakes

Darfur

March 2004-

Estimated at

Donkeys, Black

Causing serious

Present

450,000

Dog, Black

bodily or mental

Monkey, Slave

harm to the group;
Imposing
measures intended
to prevent births
within the group

As can be seen from the table, the two cases are similar, yet different. The Tutsis
in Rwanda and the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit in Darfur were dehumanized prior to the
genocide, and the women in both genocides experienced sexual dehumanization.
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However, in Darfur, sexual dehumanization included deliberately impregnating the
women whereas in Rwanda, pregnancy was a byproduct of the rapes.
In both cases, physical dehumanization included reducing the targeted groups to
animals, including cockroaches, hyenas, monkeys, snakes, and dogs. In Rwanda, this
dehumanization occurred over a period of time, and was spread via the popular radio
station RTLM and the newspaper Kangura. Paul Rusesabagina (2006), the manager of
the Milles Collines hotel and inspiration for the film Hotel Rwanda, discussed this
process of dehumanization in his autobiography. Rusesabagina (2006) correctly points
out that “Stripping the humanity from an entire group takes time. It is an attitude that
requires cultivation, a series of small steps, daily tending” (p. 64). RTLM did not
immediately start out with calling Tutsis cockroaches, but built up to it over time; with
their repeated, casual use of the term, Rwandans became desensitized to the word, and
began to see Tutsis as cockroaches. Rusesabagina (2006) also states that the use of
phrases like “cut the tall trees”, “clean your neighborhood of brush”, and “do your work”
made killing sound like a responsibility and a normal thing to do (p. 82). Rusesabagina
(2006) discusses the routinization of the killings, which made them boring in time (p.
193), a claim that is supported by Hatzfeld’s (2003) book wherein he interviewed the
perpetrators of the genocide.
Like Rwanda, in Darfur, dehumanization occurred over time. However, it was
done by the government and not via the media. The succeeding governments in the postindependence era saw the Arabs as superior to the Africans, although they also used the
Darfuris as soldiers in their war against the groups in South Sudan. The people of Darfur
were treated marginally better than their southern counterparts because they were also
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Muslims, unlike the Christians and Animists in the south. Yet, when Omar al Bashir and
the NIF came into power in the late 1980s, they openly supported the Arab groups in
Darfur over the African groups in any disputes over land or grazing rights. They also
refused to provide basic services, such as roads, schools, and hospitals. If an African
Darfuri managed to get accepted to a school with proper classrooms, books, and teachers,
they would be forced to speak Arabic and be punished for not doing so, and they often
faced discrimination from the Arab teachers (Bashir, 2008). The NIF called Darfuris
“black monkey”, “black dog”, and “slave.”
When the rebel groups in Darfur demanded equal treatment and better services
from the government, the NIF responded by arming Arab groups and paying them to
slaughter the African groups in Darfur. The government would support attacks by flying
helicopters over the village being attacked. Like Rwanda, the attacks in Darfur have
become routinized: early in the morning, while the village is still asleep, the government
bombs the village, and then the Janjaweed ride into the village, killing men and boys,
raping women and girls, stealing livestock, destroying crops, and poisoning wells while
driving the survivors out of the village and into the desert (Flint & de Waal, 2005).
In both Rwanda and Darfur, mass rape occurred/is occurring. Moreover, the rapes
are an act of sexual dehumanization. In Rwanda, the Tutsi women were hypersexualized
by the media, who described them as “seductresses” and “spies” for the RPF. Kangura
warned Hutu men not to become friendly with Tutsi women, or keep a Tutsi woman as a
mistress or concubine (Gourevitch, 1998, p.88). RTLM and Kangura depicted Tutsi
women as haughty and looking down on Hutu men, thus encouraging the militias to rape
Tutsi women to “put them in their place.” The hypersexualization of Tutsi women also
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contributed to the belief that they were sexually different from Hutu women; this can be
seen through the comments rape survivors heard about wanting to know what Tutsi
women “look like” and “taste like.” The brutal case of the woman who had part of her
vagina removed by a member of the Interahamwe, who then put it on display outside her
house (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 63), shows the extreme nature of sexual
dehumanization during the genocide.
Rape was carried out to inflict physical and mental harm on the women: several
women suffered permanent damage to their reproductive organs due to gang rape or rape
with a foreign object; this serves as a constant reminder of their attacks. The women who
became pregnant had to deal with having a baby of the “enemy,” which led some to
abandon the baby or attempt to abort it. Women were often raped in front of their
families, adding to the humiliation of the attacks, and causing mental anguish for the
family members who were unable to stop the attack. Many women did not receive
adequate medical care, or any medical care at all, for their injuries, which has prolonged
their suffering. The women have been reluctant to talk about what happened, so there has
been no mental health support provided, and no outlet for the women to discuss their
thoughts and feelings about what happened to them. This perpetuates the trauma, with the
women suffering in silence.
As was the case in Rwanda, in Darfur, the women have been subjected to sexual
dehumanization. Like Rwanda, rapes were carried out to inflict physical and mental harm
on the women: the women are circumcised, which makes the rape especially painful
because the narrow opening created during the circumcision is forced open. When young
girls are raped, the damage done to their bodies is significant. Bashir (2008) described
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one rape victim’s genitals as “…a raw, bloodied mess” and stated that when the first
attacker forced himself inside her, “…He had ripped her apart” (p. 213). Treating the rape
victims is extremely difficult, as they often have to be sewn back together to stop the
bleeding. The Janjaweed know that the girls are circumcised, and the deliberate targeting
of young girls is done to inflict maximum physical harm upon the group.
Unlike Rwanda, however, the Janjaweed purposely rape the women to
impregnate them with a so-called Arab baby, and taunt the victims afterwards that they
will give birth to a light-skinned baby. Investigations carried out by Médecins Sans
Frontiéres (2005), Amnesty International (2004) and Human Rights Watch (2005)
confirm that women are targeted for rape as an act of changing the ethnic makeup in
Darfur via the impregnation of women with an Arab baby. In addition to this deliberate
pregnancy tactic, the Janjaweed are attacking young, unmarried women knowing that
they will be considered “damaged” after, and thus unmarriageable. If a girl cannot get
married, she cannot contribute to her group’s biological reproduction and growth. This
violence does not only inflict physical damage; it also causes severe mental harm to the
women and the community. Many rape survivors, like Bashir (2008), feel guilty that they
did not fight off their attackers or die trying, which is the expected behavior in their
community. Women also consider themselves spoiled or damaged, like Bashir (2008)
did. This shame and guilt causes mental anguish in the survivors, which is exacerbated if
their families reject or disown them.
Both cases help support my research questions, which were: how was/is
dehumanization spread in these countries? What was/is the impact of physical and sexual
dehumanization on each genocide? When genocide ends, what steps can we take to re-
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humanize both the victims and killers? Is it possible to facilitate reconciliation between
the two groups to prevent a new or continuing cycle of violence? We can clearly see that
dehumanization was spread by the governments and elite groups in both countries via the
media and the use of structural violence. Physical dehumanization allowed the
participants to see the victims as less than human, as “cockroaches,” “snakes,” “dogs,”
“monkeys,” and “hyenas.” By reducing the victims to something that is culturally reviled
in both countries, this made it easier for the participants to kill without hesitation. Sexual
dehumanization in Rwanda reduced Tutsi women to objects for sexual gratification,
hypersexual beings who denied Hutu men the ability to have sex with them and thus
deserved to be “put in their place” by the militias. Sexual dehumanization in Darfur
reduced the women to their basic biological function of reproduction, a function that was
to be controlled by the Janjaweed to propagate the Arab groups and prevent the birth of
African groups. With regard to the last two questions, my recommendations for those can
be found later in this chapter.
Strengths and Limitations of the Dissertation
One of the biggest strengths of this dissertation is that it adds to the discussion of
dehumanization in genocide. One of the questions that is often asked by people learning
about genocide is “why did it happen?” By analyzing dehumanization in detail, including
the routinization of genocide, this study can help individuals understand how people are
convinced to take part in genocide, which in turn helps them understand why genocide
happens. In Rwanda, most of the killings were done by people who knew their victims:
they were neighbors, co-workers, even family members. The perpetrators went door-todoor and killed people in their houses, in schools, hospitals, and churches. This would not
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have been possible without the systemic, widespread dehumanization of the Tutsis. In
Darfur, the dehumanization of the African groups allows the Janjaweed to kill with
impunity. When you no longer recognize someone as human, when you no longer see
them as your equal, it is much easier to overlook the moral imperative against killing.
Another strength is the discussion of sexual dehumanization. This is a relatively
new idea in the field of genocide studies, as most work on genocide focuses on the
physical dehumanization, the act of reducing the victims from human beings to an animal
or lifeform unworthy of protection. Sexual dehumanization is largely carried out against
women, although men can be the targets as well. Sexual dehumanization degrades
women, reducing them to their basic biological functions, as was the case in Darfur, or
labeling them as sexually “different” or “special”, as was the case in Rwanda. Sexual
dehumanization in Rwanda led to the mass rape of Tutsi women as a reward for the
perpetrators, or as an act of humiliation against women who were described as looking
down on the men. Sexual dehumanization also created a set of circumstances in which
Tutsi women were raped so men could see how different they were from Hutu women,
because Tutsi women supposedly looked and tasted different. This made Tutsi women a
novelty to be experienced. Sexual dehumanization in Darfur demoted women from fully
human to a carrier of human life, a womb. Women were attacked because of their
reproductive necessity for the group. If a woman is impregnated with an Arab baby or
made unmarriageable, then they cannot contribute to the group’s biological expansion.
The goal of the Janjaweed is to ethnically cleanse Darfur by killing off the current
generations and preventing the creation of future generations.
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However, there are some limitations to this study. The first is that the study relied
on literature to explain this phenomenon. The danger with this is that sometimes the
literature is not completely accurate. To avoid this, I used sources that are reliable, such
as reports from reputable organizations like Doctors Without Borders, Human Rights
Watch, and Amnesty International. Still, I am unable to verify the accuracy of their
information. In order to verify the information, I would have needed to do fieldwork,
which was not possible. Nonetheless, I do believe that the information presented in this
dissertation is as accurate as possible, and the overlap of information in multiple sources
seems to suggest that this information is reliable.
The second limitation is that most of the literature on Darfur is from 2004-2006.
With Rwanda, using literature from the mid-1990’s to the early 2000’s is acceptable,
because there is a bounded time period for the genocide, which was 100 days. However,
the Darfur genocide is still occurring. The reason that most of the literature on Darfur is
from 2004-2006 is due to the fact that awareness about the events in Darfur reached their
peak during these three years, and then sharply dropped off as people lost interest and
news organizations moved on to other topics. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain current
events in Darfur, to see if the mass rapes and murders are still being carried out. A
Bloomberg report (2016) from February of this year stated that 73,000 people have had to
flee Darfur due to recent fighting, but it was one of the few reports I could find on what is
happening now in Darfur. Nonetheless, most of the literature states that the worst crimes
in Darfur occurred between 2004-2005, which is why the research is heavily skewed
toward that time period. The literature from these years provided a wealth of information,
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and even if the attacks have decreased, there is enough evidence to show that the
government of Sudan has committed genocide in Darfur.
Future Research and Policy Implications
The goal of this dissertation was to contribute to the understanding of how
dehumanization plays a role in facilitating genocide, and how physical and sexual
dehumanization work in genocide. I chose two cases where both physical and sexual
dehumanization can be clearly recognized, although neither have been studied in great
detail in the existing literature on the Rwandan and Darfur genocides. The term sexual
dehumanization is almost nonexistent in studies on rape in genocide. In fact, all too often,
rape is not seen as an act of genocide, but an act that occurs during genocide. By
conducting this study, I hope to pave the way for other researchers to study sexual
dehumanization and rape as an act of genocide in greater detail.
As I was collecting research for this dissertation, I could not help but notice that
in most of the books and articles on genocide, rape was not mentioned very often, and if
it was, it was almost discussed as a separate issue. When the claim is made that women in
Darfur are sent to collect the firewood and draw water because they will “only” get raped,
this downplays the impact rape has on the women, and by extension, the community.
When I discuss genocide with people, they usually think of murder or killing as acts of
genocide, but not rape. More research needs to be done on rape as an act of genocide, so
that it will be recognized as such. The Akayesu trial at the ICTR, when the mayor was
found guilty of rape as an act of genocide, was especially significant, as he was the first
person to be convicted by an international tribunal of rape as genocide (Neuffer, 2001, p.
272). However, the fact that it took until 1997 for rape to be recognized as an act of
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genocide reflects our lack of acknowledgment that rape can be an act of genocide. Rape
during genocide has a specific intentionality, whether it be to cause severe physical or
mental harm to the group, or as a measure intended to prevent births within the group,
and more work must be done to separate rape as an act of genocide from rape in general.
This dissertation can also serve as a reference for future research on rape in other
genocides. For example, ISIS’s sexual enslavement and rape of the Yazidi women is a
case that will be studied in depth in the future, and it would be interesting to compare
how sexual dehumanization has been used against the Yazidi women to how it was used
against the Tutsis and Darfuri women. There can also be other cross-case comparisons,
such as looking at sexual dehumanization and rape in the former Yugoslavia or
Cambodia.
As I worked on this dissertation, I thought of some policy recommendations that
could be made for scholars, activists, and politicians. There are many things that can be
done to stop dehumanization before it leads to genocide. As was seen in Rwanda, the
media played a significant role in the fostering and spreading of dehumanizing language
and ideology. Many foreign governments knew about the language being used by the
media, but they did little or nothing to stop it. According to Des Forges (2007), Human
Rights Watch and other NGOs called for the RTLM signal to be jammed by the US and
UN, but the US government refused to do so, claiming that it would be a violation of free
speech (p. 51). Had the RTLM signal been jammed, many people could have been saved
when the Interahamwe were not being directed to a house or gathering place to kill
people. Currently, there is concern over the language being used by the media in Burundi;
some of the language is reminiscent of that used in Rwanda. The monitoring of hate
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language is critical to stopping genocide, as hate speech, including dehumanizing terms,
is often indicative of a potential genocide.
I realize this is a difficult argument to make, as there could be concerns about
limiting free speech. However, in most countries, including the United States, language
that is used to incite killings or hate crimes is not protected speech. Furthermore, the
longer the international community ignores the use of phrases that call for the
extermination of a particular group, or the use of terms that reduce members of that group
to non-humans, the easier it becomes to persuade people to take part in a genocide.
Hatzfeld (2003) and others have demonstrated that perpetrators in Rwanda were
convinced to take part in the killings because they no longer saw the Tutsis as humans,
but as cockroaches, snakes, etc. Methods of countering dehumanization include jamming
radio signals, punishing editors of newspapers or website that publish content that
promotes hate or incites killing, and creating alternative media outlets to counter the hate
speech. During the Burundian Civil War in the 1990s, international groups created a
radio station where members of the various communities could come together to share
their concerns, and also repudiate rumors of attacks in a certain community by having
people living in those areas call in and make it clear that no attack was underway
(Dahinden, 2007). This could be helpful in a country where a group is being accused of
carrying out massacres in order to promote fear among the other groups and facilitate the
killing of the targeted group.
Another policy recommendation is medical and psychological help for the victims
of rape. Too many women in Rwanda and Darfur did not receive the medical care they
desperately needed, which caused permanent damage in some cases. The government of
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Sudan has blocked aid workers from entering the country, thus preventing much needed
medical care in the aftermath of a rape such as an exam, emergency contraceptives, and
HIV prophylaxis, as well as pregnancy support. Women and girls have been traumatized
by rape, but they have been unable to talk about it due to cultural restrictions as well as
personal shame and guilt. These women and girls need to be able to speak to someone
about what happened, and to understand that what happened to them was not their fault.
The cultural norms in Darfur of seeing rape victims as spoiled goods makes
victims extremely reluctant to come forward and report what happened, and the
erroneous belief that a woman cannot get pregnant via rape stigmatizes the victims.
While it is not the place of international aid workers to change cultural beliefs, it is
important for them to meet with the communities and help them understand that the
women need their support and help, instead of being shamed and disowned. If a woman
is kicked out of her family home, then she needs to be given a safe place to establish a
shelter, one where she is not vulnerable to rape or sexual coercion by soldiers or men in
the camps. Mental health counseling should be provided for the victims, so they can heal
mentally as well as physically.
Finally, my last recommendation is to ensure that not only do the victims of
genocide be re-humanized, but also the perpetrators. This is a difficult concept to
understand, as it is human nature to be disgusted by an individual who commits a heinous
act, especially murder. All too often, the perpetrators of genocide are labeled “monsters,”
“devils,” and “evil.” A 1994 edition of Time magazine quoted a missionary on its cover
stating that “There are no devils left in Hell…They are all in Rwanda.” While this
sentiment is understandable, it continues the cycle of dehumanization. People take
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comfort in the idea that perpetrators are evil, and that they themselves would never do
something like that. However, as uncomfortable as this might make us, the truth is
anyone can commit an act of genocide, given the right set of circumstances. If we
acknowledge that, then we can break the cycle of dehumanization. A study done by
Ĉehajić, Brown, and Gonález (2009) measured empathy for victims, as felt by the
perpetrators. The authors used students at a university in two experiments, and discovered
that reminders of ingroup responsibility for their actions are a way for perpetrators to
come to terms with what happened, and thus create empathy for their victims (p. 726).
The best way to do this, according to Ĉehajić et al. (2009), is to expose the perpetrators to
stories of individual harm done, while also being aware of the collective violence done
against the targeted group (p. 726).
This can be seen in Rwanda, through the Gacaca process. Due to the number of
people accused of taking part in the genocide, the court system was unable to try every
suspect. The Rwandan government then reinstated the local systems of justice in order to
try suspects more quickly. A number of perpetrators confessed their guilt, and were
sentenced to community service instead of jail. This has had the benefit of reintegrating
the perpetrators into the communities, while making up for the loss a community suffered
when many of its inhabitants were killed. While the Gacaca system is not without its
flaws, including false confessions by people to get out of jail, the system has been
effective overall in re-humanizing both the victims and the perpetrators.
Another recommendation is providing economic support for the victims of
genocide. The participants in the Totten and Ubaldo (2011) study discussed life in postgenocide Rwanda and the difficulties they have encountered. Umulisa told the
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researchers that the government has built houses some survivors, but not nearly enough,
nor are they built well (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 63). In addition, health insurance is
provided for the very poorest survivors, but other poor survivors receive no assistance;
there is no mental health support (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 63). Education for orphans
and survivors is lacking; many survivors were so traumatized that getting a formal
education is extremely difficult, most people cannot afford university tuition, and the
government has a hard time keeping teachers in the poor, rural areas (Totten & Ubaldo,
2011, p. 63). Rwanda is still a developing country, which means providing financial
support for all of the survivors is not possible, but humanitarian aid could help alleviate
some of the burden.
The outcome of the genocide in Darfur is uncertain, but I envision three
possibilities: 1. The government forces can overtake the rebels, forcing a negotiated
peace agreement on the government’s terms; 2. The rebels can defeat the government
forces, and negotiate a treaty that would benefit their groups; and 3. The government of
Sudan is overthrown in a coup or possible uprising, and the new government ends the
policy of genocide in Darfur. The third option is unlikely, although Bashir is losing
support in the north, the long-held support base for the NIF. If a peace agreement is
somehow negotiated in Darfur, a system of community-based justice will be needed to
address the crimes. Marlowe, Bain, and Shapiro (2006) were told by one of their
interviewees that if the government left Darfur, and the Janjaweed were defeated, then
the two sides would negotiate an agreement and live together again (p. 109). As the
African and Arab groups have co-existed in Darfur for centuries, a negotiated agreement
may be the best outcome to this conflict. A local, grassroots system of justice could help
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facilitate peace between the groups, but until the war and genocide end, there will be no
peace in Darfur. After the war ends, economic support must be provided for the people of
Darfur and their needs must be met to prevent a reoccurrence of war.
Concluding Thoughts
In Rwanda and Darfur, physical and sexual dehumanization were extensive
during the genocide. The physical dehumanization made it easier for the targeted groups
to be massacred, and the sexual dehumanization led to the mass rape of women in both
countries. Both genocides could have been stopped, but they were not. Rwanda and
Darfur are important cases to study to understand why and how genocide occur. More
research needs to be done, in order to create policies that could stop a future genocide
from happening. As Gourevitch (1998) points out,
The West’s post-Holocaust pledge that genocide would never again be tolerated
proved to be hollow, and for all the fine sentiments inspired by the memory of
Auschwitz, the problem remains that denouncing evil is a far cry from doing good
(p. 170).
It is my hope that this dissertation will inspire others to carry on this important research,
and broaden our understanding of the nuances of genocide. While dehumanization is only
one part of genocide, it is an important aspect that has been overlooked, one that can, and
must, be included in future research on genocide.
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